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Eggshell Economics: A Revolutionary Approach to
the Eggshell Plaintiff Rule
STEVE P. CALANDRILLO* & DUSTIN E. BUEHLER†
For more than a century, courts have universally applied the eggshell plaintiff
rule, which holds tortfeasors liable for the full extent of the harm inflicted on
vulnerable “eggshell” victims. Liability attaches even when the victim’s
condition and the scope of her injuries were completely unforeseeable ex ante.
This Article explores the implications of this rule by providing a pioneering
economic analysis of eggshell liability. It argues that the eggshell plaintiff rule
misaligns parties’ incentives in a socially undesirable way. The rule subjects
injurers to unfair surprise, fails to incentivize socially optimal behavior when
injurers have imperfect information about expected accident losses, and fails
to account for risk aversion, moral hazard, and judgment-proof problems.
Additionally, the eggshell plaintiff rule dulls victims’ incentives to take care
and to self-protect.
To solve these problems, this Article proposes a revolutionary approach to
eggshell liability: courts should reject the eggshell plaintiff rule and replace it
with a foreseeability rule. Under this approach, tortfeasors would be liable
only for the reasonably foreseeable scope of victims’ injuries. Insurance
markets would then step in to compensate eggshell victims for unforeseeable
losses, thereby preserving the compensatory role served by the traditional
eggshell plaintiff rule without compromising optimal behavioral incentives for
injurers and victims.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A customer slips and falls in a store, suffering an unusually rare and severe
fracture of his femur.1 He sues the store for negligence.2 Although the store
admits its negligence, it argues it should not be liable for the unusual and

1 The following factual scenario is based loosely on Gresham v. Petro Stopping
Centers, LP, No. 3:09-cv-00034-RCJ-VPC, 2011 WL 1748569, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 25,
2011).
2 Slip-and-fall incidents are remarkably common, leading to thousands of lawsuits
each year. See Protecting Ourselves from Slips, Trips and Falls, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL,
http://www.nsc.org/safety_home/Resources/Pages/Falls.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2012)
(noting that in 2007 alone, “more than 21,700 Americans died as a result of falls and more
than 7.9 million were injured by a fall”).
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unforeseeable scope of the injury.3 To support its argument, the store introduces
evidence suggesting that the customer could have done more to prevent the
severity of his injuries.4 The evidence shows that a treatable disease has
dramatically weakened his bones for more than a decade,5 in part because he
never bothered to seek diagnosis.6 The court rejects this argument out of hand,
however, simply noting that “defendants take plaintiffs as they find them.”7
In doing so, the court relies on the eggshell plaintiff rule, “[t]he principle
that a defendant is liable for a plaintiff’s unforeseeable and uncommon reactions
to the defendant’s negligent or intentional act.”8 Under the rule, a defendant at
fault is liable for the full extent of plaintiff’s injuries, even if the plaintiff
possesses preexisting conditions that dramatically worsen the harm.9 Most
alarmingly, liability attaches even when the plaintiff’s vulnerable condition and
the scope of the resulting injuries were completely unforeseeable.10 The
practical consequence is that a defendant can be on the hook for extraordinary
damages arising from relatively ordinary conduct.11
This makes the eggshell plaintiff rule an odd duck in modern tort law.
During the last century, the common law of torts moved away from rigid strict
liability rules, toward malleable notions of foreseeability.12 And yet courts left
the eggshell plaintiff rule’s sharp edges and harsh consequences “virtually
3 See, e.g., Glamann v. Kirk, 29 P.3d 255, 258 (Alaska 2001); see also Gresham, 2011

WL 1748569, at *4 (noting that defendant seeks to introduce evidence of plaintiff’s
preexisting condition).
4 See Gresham, 2011 WL 1748569, at *3–4.
5 See Health Guide: Osteoporosis, N.Y. TIMES, http://health.nytimes.com/
health/guides/disease/osteoporosis/overview.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2012) (“Osteoporosis
is a disease in which bones become fragile and more likely to fracture. Usually the bone
loses density, which measures the amount of calcium and minerals in the bone.”).
6 See id. (discussing diagnosis and treatment methods for osteoporosis).
7 Vidrine v. Sentry Indem. Co., 341 So. 2d 558, 563 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Shia v.
Chvasta, 377 S.E.2d 644, 648 (W. Va. 1988).
8 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 593 (9th ed. 2009). Alternatively, courts and scholars call
this the “eggshell-skull rule,” the “thin-skull rule,” the “special-sensitivity rule,” or the “oldsoldier’s rule.” Id.
9 See Bruneau v. Quick, 447 A.2d 742, 750–51 (Conn. 1982); McCahill v. N.Y.
Transp. Co., 94 N.E. 616, 617–18 (N.Y. 1911); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461
(1965).
10 E.g., Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2002); Brackett
v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 81 (7th Cir. 1993); Schafer v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 897, 900 (Colo.
1992); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 291
(5th ed., Lawyer’s ed. 1984).
11 See, e.g., Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546–47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)
(finding a driver in a “minor” car accident liable for $500,000 because the other driver’s
“relatively minor . . . whiplash” turned into a debilitating mental disorder).
12 Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for
Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 989 (2001); see also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99–101 (N.Y. 1928).
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untouched.”13 The rule is a doctrinal dinosaur—“one of the few unchanged
surviving elements of our ancient legal heritage.”14
Perhaps the eggshell plaintiff rule has survived because it comports with
tort law’s general goal of compensating victims for their injuries.15 To some
extent, the rule appeals to our sense of justice because it shifts the burden of
accident costs from victims to tortfeasors.16 And some scholars argue that
eggshell liability is essential for tort law’s deterrence function—if courts were
to impose liability only for the foreseeable extent of harm, tortfeasors would not
internalize the full cost of their actions and would have diluted incentives to
take care and prevent injuries.17
Whatever the rationale, the eggshell plaintiff rule is universally accepted
and widely applied.18 All American jurisdictions award eggshell damages.19
Hundreds of judicial opinions have relied on the eggshell plaintiff rule during
the last decade alone.20 Indeed, the rule is so well established that scholars have
largely ignored it.21 Everyone apparently accepts the wisdom of the eggshell
plaintiff rule, as well as its role in American tort law.
Everyone, that is, except us. Instead of taking the traditional arguments at
face value, this Article explores the true effects of eggshell liability by
13 Gary L. Bahr & Bruce N. Graham, The Thin Skull Plaintiff Concept: Evasive or
Persuasive, 15 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 409, 418 (1982).
14 Id. at 410.
15 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, at 6.
16 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 524 (7th ed. 2000); see
also William J. Harte, Note, Liability for the Aggravation of a Pre-Existing Condition:
Including the Allergy Factor, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 224, 224 (1958) (“One of weak
physical structure has as much right to protection from bodily harm as a robust athlete.”);
Anna I. Shinkle, Note, Taking the Plaintiff as You Find Him, 16 DRAKE L. REV. 49, 50
(1966) (noting that in eggshell cases, justice is better served if the consequences of the
eggshell injury fall upon the negligent defendant rather than the innocent plaintiff).
17 See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 422–28
(4th ed. 2009); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 250 (1987).
18 See McAllister Towing of Va., Inc. v. United States, No. 2:10cv595, 2012 WL
1438770, at *26 (E.D. Va. Apr. 25, 2012) (citing the “universally accepted” eggshell
plaintiff rule); accord In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (1964).
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 31
cmt. b, reporters’ note (2005) (“Every United States jurisdiction adheres to the thin-skull
rule; more precisely, extensive research has failed to identify a single United States case
disavowing the rule.”).
20 The following search, run through Westlaw’s All State and Federal Cases database,
yielded 233 cases: “thin skull” “eggshell skull” “eggshell plaintiff” (“defendant takes” /5
(plaintiff victim) /5 finds /5 (him her them)) & da(aft 7/1/2002 & bef 7/1/2012) (query last
performed Aug. 1, 2012).
21 See Bahr & Graham, supra note 13, at 410 (“Tucked neatly away in a crevice of
Prosser’s Mount Proximate Cause, the thin skull principle has been interred by decades of
dogmatic legal apathy.”).
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providing a pioneering economic analysis of the eggshell plaintiff rule.22 In
particular, the Article uses economic theory to determine whether the rule
provides proper incentives for parties to take optimal actions ex ante that reduce
accident losses and social costs.23
We argue that the eggshell plaintiff rule significantly misaligns parties’
incentives in a socially undesirable way. The rule subjects injurers to unfair
surprise, fails to incentivize socially optimal behavior when injurers have
imperfect information about expected accident losses, and fails to account for
the effects of risk aversion, moral hazard, and judgment-proof problems.
Additionally, by offering compensation for the full extent of injuries, the
eggshell plaintiff rule dulls victims’ incentives to take care and self-protect
against losses.
To better align the incentives of injurers and victims alike, this Article
proposes a revolutionary approach: courts should reject the eggshell plaintiff
rule and replace it with a foreseeability rule. Under this approach, injurers
would not be liable for the unusual or unforeseeable extent of harm suffered by
vulnerable victims. Instead, insurance markets would compensate eggshell
plaintiffs for unforeseeable losses.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II briefly examines the
development of the eggshell plaintiff rule, from its origins in nineteenth-century
case law to the current debate over the rule’s proper application. This Part
shows that the eggshell plaintiff rule subjects tortfeasors to potentially limitless
liability, as long as the tortfeasor was at fault and her actions were a cause in
fact of the eggshell victim’s injuries.
Part III provides an unprecedented economic analysis of the eggshell
plaintiff rule. It argues that eggshell liability misaligns the behavioral incentives
of both injurers and victims. Generally, injurers are ignorant of the true extent
of liability and misestimate expected damages, leading them to exercise suboptimal levels of care and activity. To the extent that risk-averse injurers are
aware of the eggshell plaintiff rule, the possibility of exorbitant liability for
unforeseeable consequences induces them to exercise too much care and engage
in too little activity. Moreover, because victims receive full compensation under
the eggshell plaintiff rule, they have no incentive to discover their
vulnerabilities and self-protect.
Finally, Part IV outlines our proposal for a foreseeability-based approach to
eggshell liability. Tortfeasors would be liable only for the reasonably
22 Economic analysis of the eggshell plaintiff rule is virtually nonexistent, consisting of
no more than a few fleeting references. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 238–39 (8th ed. 2011) (briefly mentioning eggshell liability); STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 236–37 (2004) (same).
23 Economic analysis of the law involves “application of economic theory and
econometric methods to examine the formation, structure, processes, and impact of law and
legal institutions.” Charles K. Rowley, Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, in
LAW AND ECONOMICS 123, 125 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989).
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foreseeable extent of victims’ injuries, regardless of whether they injure an
eggshell victim, a “normal” victim, or an unusually resilient “steel skull”
victim. Although the tort system would no longer compensate eggshell victims
for the full extent of their injuries, private or social insurance would serve this
purpose. Ultimately, a foreseeability approach would enhance certainty,
incentivize injurers to behave optimally, and encourage eggshell victims to selfprotect and insure themselves against risk.

II. EVOLUTION OF THE EGGSHELL PLAINTIFF RULE
The eggshell plaintiff rule originated in nineteenth-century case law, when
American and English courts began imposing liability on defendants for the full
extent of damages caused to physically vulnerable plaintiffs.24 Initially, courts
limited the rule to cases involving victims whose preexisting conditions were
purely physical.25 Over time, many courts extended application of the eggshell
plaintiff rule to cases involving mental harm and economic injury.26
Considerable debate regarding the scope of the rule continues today, despite its
universal acceptance in American jurisdictions and its entrenchment in state
common law.27

A. Historical Origins of the Rule
The eggshell plaintiff rule was born in concept, if not in name, in 1891.
That year, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Vosburg v.
Putney.28 In a common childhood altercation, twelve-year-old George Putney
kicked fourteen-year-old Andrew Vosburg in the shin in a classroom in
Waukesha, Wisconsin.29 Unbeknownst to Putney, Vosburg had injured his leg
the month before in a sledding accident.30 The kick aggravated the previous

24 See infra Part II.A.
25 See infra Part II.B.
26 See infra Part II.C.
27 See infra Part II.D.
28 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891). Vosburg has somewhat of a cult following among law

professors—the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s two-page opinion has spawned hundreds of
pages of analysis in law reviews. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Vosburg Comes
First, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 853, 853; Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Cyberbullies Beware: Reconsidering
Vosburg v. Putney in the Internet Age, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 379, 379 (2011); Robert L.
Rabin, Vosburg v. Putney in Three-Part Disharmony, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 863, 863; Marshall
S. Shapo, Knowing Foul from Fair: Vosburg, Garratt and One Long Fly Ball, 37 WASHBURN
L.J. 243, 243 (1998); Zigurds L. Zile, Vosburg v. Putney: A Centennial Story, 1992 WIS. L.
REV. 877, 877.
29 Vosburg, 50 N.W. at 403; see also Zile, supra note 28, at 883–85 (providing a
detailed account of the circumstances surrounding Putney’s infamous kick).
30 See Vosburg, 50 N.W. at 403; Zile, supra note 28, at 880–81.
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injury and eventually led to Vosburg’s permanent incapacitation.31 The court
found Putney liable for all damages arising as a result of the kick, even though
he did not intend the harm, nor was he aware of Vosburg’s previous injury.32
According to the court, “the wrongdoer is liable for all the injuries resulting
directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been
foreseen by him.”33
Other courts began adopting similar rules.34 For example, in a Minnesota
case decided eight years after Vosburg,35 a salesman sprained his ankle while
exiting a train, developed inflammatory rheumatism because of the sprain, and
died from inflammation of the heart.36 The court concluded that plaintiff’s
predisposition to rheumatism was immaterial and held the defendant liable
“even though he could not have foreseen the particular results which did in fact
follow.”37
The term “thin skull” plaintiff finally emerged in 1901, when an English
court decided Dulieu v. White & Sons.38 In Dulieu, a negligently driven horse
van crashed into a pub.39 A pregnant woman working behind the bar suffered
severe shock as a result of the crash, became seriously ill, and gave premature

31 The Waukesha Freeman reported at the time that “Vosburg was confined to his bed
for a long time, is now unable to go without crutches, and will probably be a cripple for
life.” Zile, supra note 28, at 903 (quoting Still A-Troubling, WAUKESHA FREEMAN, Oct. 24,
1889, at 1).
32 Vosburg, 50 N.W. at 403. The context of Putney’s kick may have influenced the
court’s conclusion on liability. The court suggested that it might not have held Putney liable
had he kicked Vosburg “upon the play-grounds of the school” while “engaged in the usual
boyish sports,” instead of doing so after class “had been called to order by the teacher, and
after the regular exercises of the school had commenced.” Id.
33 Id. at 404.
34 See, e.g., Montgomery & E. Ry. Co. v. Mallette, 9 So. 363, 366 (Ala. 1891) (holding
the defendant liable for aggravating plaintiff’s prior injury); Freeman v. Mercantile Mut.
Accident Ass’n, 30 N.E. 1013, 1014 (Mass. 1892) (“An injury which might naturally
produce death in a person of a certain temperament or state of health is the cause of his
death, if he dies by reason of it, even if he would not have died if his temperament or
previous health had been different.”); Hawkins v. Front St.-Cable Ry. Co., 28 P. 1021, 1024
(Wash. 1892) (allowing a plaintiff to recover when defendant’s negligence caused her child
to be stillborn, despite evidence of “insufficient nourishment”), overruled on other grounds
by Brown v. Brown, 675 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Wash. 1984).
35 Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co., 78 N.W. 965, 965 (Minn. 1899).
36 Id. at 965.
37 Id.; see also Spade v. Lynn & Bos. R.R., 52 N.E. 747, 748 (Mass. 1899) (holding
that “if the defendant’s servant did commit an unjustifiable battery on the plaintiff’s person,
the defendant must answer for the actual consequences of that wrong to her as she was, and
cannot cut down her damages by showing that the effect would have been less upon a
normal person”).
38 [1901] 2 K.B. 669 at 679 (Eng.).
39 Id.
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birth.40 The court awarded the woman damages, reasoning that it is “no answer
to the sufferer’s claim for damages that he would have suffered less injury or no
injury at all, if he had not had an unusually thin skull or an unusually weak
heart.”41

B. Development of the Doctrine
The eggshell plaintiff rule soon developed into a doctrine used by courts to
award damages in cases involving a variety of preexisting physical conditions.
As Jacob Stein notes, these cases generally fall into four categories.42 First,
courts apply the rule when defendants unearth a latent condition ailing
plaintiffs.43 For example, in Reed v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,44 the plaintiff
was injured when his truck hit an exposed replacement rail as he crossed the
defendant’s train tracks, aggravating an unknown, preexisting degenerative disk
condition.45 A federal appellate court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a
jury instruction on the eggshell plaintiff rule; the fact that his condition was
previously unknown was of no consequence.46
Second, the rule applies when a defendant’s negligence re-activates a
plaintiff’s preexisting condition that had subsided due to treatment.47 In
Bruneau v. Quick,48 the defendant performed an operation on the plaintiff’s
feet, which worsened an existing foot condition that the plaintiff had struggled
with her entire life.49 The defendant argued that his actions did not aggravate an
unknown preexisting condition.50 The court nonetheless concluded that
application of the eggshell plaintiff rule was appropriate and held the defendant
40 Id.
41 Id. at 679.
42 See JACOB A. STEIN, 2 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 11:1 (3d ed.).
43 Id. (“An illustration of this principle is a case involving a plaintiff with diabetes, who

is apparently in good health prior to the defendant’s conduct.”); see, e.g., Stoleson v. United
States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir. 1983); Owen v. Dix, 196 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Ark.
1946); Intermill v. Heumesser, 391 P.2d 684, 687 (Colo. 1964); Knoblock v. Morris, 220
P.2d 171, 174 (Kan. 1950); Royer v. Eskovitz, 100 N.W.2d 306, 308 (Mich. 1960); Nelson
v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 58 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Minn. 1953); Watford v. Morse, 118
S.E.2d 681, 683 (Va. 1961); Reeder v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 250 P.2d 518, 522 (Wash.
1952).
44 185 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 1999).
45 Id. at 714.
46 Id. at 716–17.
47 STEIN, supra note 42, § 11:1; see, e.g., Wise v. Carter, 119 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1960); Dzurik v. Tamura, 359 P.2d 164, 165 (Haw. 1960); Walters v. Smith, 158
A.2d 619, 621 (Md. 1960); Rawson v. Bradshaw, 480 A.2d 37, 41 (N.H. 1984); Watson v.
Wilkinson Trucking Co., 136 S.E.2d 286, 291 (S.C. 1964); Cobb v. Waddell, 369 S.W.2d
743, 746 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963).
48 447 A.2d 742 (Conn. 1982).
49 Id. at 744–45.
50 Id. at 750.
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liable for injuries that were “different in degree” because of plaintiff’s
condition.51
The third eggshell plaintiff category imposes liability on defendants if their
actions aggravate known, preexisting conditions that have not yet received
medical attention.52 For example, in Glamann v. Kirk,53 the defendant’s car
rear-ended the plaintiff’s truck, resulting in severe headaches from whiplash and
cervical spine injuries.54 The defendant argued that she should not be liable for
the extent of the injuries, on the theory that plaintiff’s headaches had been
caused in part by a fractured jaw from a prior car accident.55 The Alaska
Supreme Court rejected the argument and held defendant liable for the full
extent of plaintiff’s injuries.56
Finally, the eggshell plaintiff rule applies when a tortfeasor accelerates an
inevitable disability or loss of life due to a condition possessed by the plaintiff,
even when the injury would have eventually occurred in the absence of
defendant’s negligent conduct.57 McCahill v. New York Transportation Co.58
provides a representative example of this category of eggshell plaintiff cases. In
that case, one of the defendant’s employees negligently drove a taxi and struck
the plaintiff, who suffered from alcoholism.59 After sustaining various broken
bones, the plaintiff died in the hospital from a condition associated with
alcoholism.60 The court affirmed an award of additional damages even though
plaintiff’s alcoholism likely would have eventually resulted in his premature
death.61
In addition to these four categories, a few other features of the eggshell
plaintiff rule bear mentioning. First, the rule extends to injuries that do not
51 Id. at 751.
52 STEIN, supra note 42, § 11:1 (“For example, a patient who has been found to have an

active case of diabetes can be treated with insulin. However, an injury may make the disease
materially more difficult to control or may result in complications. Such a result is properly
described as an aggravation of the preexisting condition.”); see, e.g., Maurer v. United
States, 668 F.2d 98, 99–100 (2d Cir. 1981); Pozzie v. Mike Smith, Inc., 337 N.E.2d 450, 453
(Ill. App. Ct. 1975); Reed v. Harvey, 110 N.W.2d 442, 448 (Iowa 1961); Louisville Taxicab
& Transfer Co. v. Hill, 201 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Ky. 1947); Gallardo v. New Orleans
Steamboat Co., 459 So. 2d 1215, 1217 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Gregory v. Shannon, 367 P.2d
152, 154 (Wash. 1961).
53 29 P.3d 255, 261 (Alaska 2001).
54 Id. at 257–58.
55 Id. at 258.
56 Id. at 261.
57 STEIN, supra note 42, § 11:1; see, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 328 F.2d 502,
504 (5th Cir. 1964); Holman v. T.I.M.E. Freight, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 462, 469 (W.D. Ark.
1964); Bemenderfer v. Williams, 745 N.E.2d 212, 218 (Ind. 2001); Hebenstreit v. Atchison
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 336 P.2d 1057, 1061 (N.M. 1959).
58 94 N.E. 616, 617–18 (N.Y. 1911).
59 Id. at 617.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 618.

384

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:3

immediately manifest themselves at the time of the defendant’s tortious
action.62 Second, the defendant must be at fault for the eggshell plaintiff rule to
apply—in order to trigger the rule, the court must first conclude that the
defendant breached a duty, and the breach caused the plaintiff’s harm.63 Third,
the rule imposes liability even when plaintiffs possess vulnerabilities of their
own making.64
Some scholars view the eggshell plaintiff rule “as an extension of the
foreseeability test, which does not require the extent of the injury to be
foreseeable, only the type.”65 Others view eggshell liability as an outright
exception to rules requiring foreseeability.66 Indeed, “courts are usually candid
in recognizing that unforeseen personal injuries are not subject to the general
proximate cause rule that harm be foreseeable.”67

62 For example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has allowed recovery for a

plaintiff who developed injuries three months after the defendant’s negligent acts. Lockwood
v. McCaskill, 138 S.E.2d 541, 546–47 (N.C. 1964).
63 DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 222 (3d ed. 1997).
64 In Thompson v. Lupone, for instance, an obese plaintiff suffered first-degree burns
when a waitress negligently spilled hot coffee on her. 62 A.2d 861, 862 (Conn. 1948). The
plaintiff also slammed her knee against the counter in reaction to her burns. Id. The
plaintiff’s knee injury failed to improve in part because of her obesity, yet she still received
compensation. Id. at 862–63. The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the award by reciting
the familiar eggshell plaintiff refrain: injurers must take victims as they find them. Id. at 863.
65 JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 221 (2000); see also EMERGING
ISSUES IN TORT LAW 126 (Jason W. Neyers et al. eds., 2007) (noting that the question of
what is foreseeable “is usually framed in terms of whether the damage that has occurred was
of the same type as the damage that was foreseeable”; as long as “the type or kind of damage
could have been foreseen, it does not matter that its extent or the precise manner of its
occurrence could not have been foreseen”); DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 180 (3d ed. 2004) (distinguishing between type and extent of harm
and noting that in eggshell cases, the defendant will be liable “if some injury of the general
type plaintiff sustained was a foreseeable consequence of defendant’s negligent conduct,
although the extent of the injuries may be quite unexpected” (emphasis added)).
66 JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 269–70 (2d ed. 2008).
67 Id. at 270; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, at 292 (noting that there have been
“a considerable number of more or less unclassifiable cases of what can only be described as
freak accidents of a preposterous character, in which the fact that the defendant could not
possibly have foreseen the harm to the plaintiff has been held to be no bar to recovery”); P.
J. Rowe, The Demise of the Thin Skull Rule?, 40 MOD. L. REV. 377, 387 (1977) (suggesting
that the “unwillingness of many judges, especially in personal injury cases, to particulari[z]e
the damage but to look at it ‘broadly’ is an indication of a desire to compensate the injured
without becoming over-involved in distinctions between different kinds or types of injury”).
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C. Eggshell Extensions: Mental Harm and Economic Injury
In recent decades, courts have extended the eggshell plaintiff rule to
psychological harms68 and economic injuries.69 When it comes to psychological
harm, plaintiffs in most jurisdictions may now invoke the eggshell plaintiff rule
to recover for physical and emotional harms resulting from preexisting
psychological conditions.70 For instance, in Bonner v. United States,71 the court
held the defendant liable for emotional injuries resulting from a car accident.72
In that case, the plaintiff became permanently disabled months after the initial
accident.73 The treating physician found that the accident set in motion a series
of events leading to psychiatric illness.74 After concluding that the accident was
a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s mental illness, the court held the defendant
liable for this psychological harm.75
Courts have also employed the eggshell plaintiff rule to impose liability for
economic harm resulting from unforeseen or unknowable damage to property.76
68 See, e.g., Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 780 (5th Cir. 2000); Jenson v. Eveleth
Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1294–95 (8th Cir. 1997); Wakefield v. NLRB, 779 F.2d 1437,
1438 (9th Cir. 1986); McBroom v. Iowa, 226 N.W.2d 41, 45–46 (Iowa 1975); Thames v.
Zerangue, 411 So. 2d 17, 19–20 (La. 1982); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 &
n.5 (Mass. 1978). But see Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 1991) (refusing to
extend the eggshell plaintiff rule to preexisting mental conditions).
69 See, e.g., Martin v. Cnty. of L.A., No. B142528, 2002 WL 31117056, at *8 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 25, 2002); Colonial Inn Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Gay, 680 N.E.2d 407, 416 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 31 cmt. d (2005) (noting that the eggshell plaintiff rule “is applicable to property, as
well”); Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1425, 1491 (2003) (noting that, under the eggshell plaintiff rule, “the defendant must
take the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s property as the defendant finds them”). But see Rowe,
supra note 67, at 381 (“The thin skull rule is said not to apply to damage to property,
although authority is sparse.”).
70 See AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 258 (2d ed. 2008). See generally Candice E. Renka, Note, The Presumed
Eggshell Plaintiff Rule: Determining Liability When Mental Harm Accompanies Physical
Injury, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 289 (2007). Courts also have held tortfeasors liable for
aggravation of emotional distress brought about by negligent third-party treatment of an
injury. See, e.g., Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing
Butzow v. Wausau Mem’l Hosp., 187 N.W.2d 349, 352–53 (Wis. 1971); Heims v. Hanke,
93 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Wis. 1958).
71 339 F. Supp. 640 (E.D. La. 1972).
72 Id. at 641, 650.
73 Id. at 646.
74 Id. at 647.
75 Id. at 650.
76 This extension of the eggshell plaintiff rule seems to be conceptually rooted in the
classic English tort law case, In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560
(Eng.). See TWERSKI & HENDERSON, supra note 70, at 260 (noting the similarities between
the Polemis case and eggshell plaintiff cases). In Polemis, one of the defendant’s servants
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For example, in Colonial Inn Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.,77 a
slow-moving car backed into a hotel’s air-conditioning unit, ruptured a gas line,
and caused an explosion that damaged the building.78 The hotel owner sued the
motorist to recover for the resulting property damage.79 The defendant argued
“the explosion was too bizarre to be a natural and probable consequence of
slowly backing a car into the building.”80 The court rejected this argument,
holding that liability extends to unforeseeable harms as long as the defendant’s
negligence caused the injury in fact.81 It based its ruling on the eggshell plaintiff
rule, even though “the evidence suggests that a building rather than a person
may have had an ‘eggshell skull.’”82

D. Current Debate
Expansion of the eggshell plaintiff rule has not been without controversy.
Most notably, debate continues today over the rule’s application to mental or
psychological harm. J. Stanley McQuade argues in favor of this application,83
criticizing proposals to limit recovery to mental harms that an ordinary person
would sustain, or harms “reactivat[ed]” or “exacerbat[ed]” when tortfeasors
have prior notice of a plaintiff’s eggshell status.84 Because psychological
trauma is almost always the result of a “prior predisposing condition[],”
McQuade argues that courts should treat mental harms the same way that they
treat preexisting physical conditions.85

dropped a wooden plank on a ship’s hold, which happened to contain cans of benzene that
were leaking flammable vapors. In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. at
562–63. The plank caused a spark that ignited the vapors and destroyed the ship. Id. The
court held that plaintiffs were entitled to full judgment, and reasoned that the fact that the
resulting damage was “not the exact kind of damage one would expect is immaterial, so long
as the damage is in fact directly traceable to the negligent act.” Id. at 577. In other words,
“[o]nce the act is negligent, the fact that its exact operation was not foreseen is immaterial.”
Id.
77 680 N.E.2d 407 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
78 Id. at 410–11.
79 Id. at 409.
80 Id. at 414.
81 Id. at 416.
82 Id.
83 See generally J. Stanley McQuade, The Eggshell Skull Rule and Related Problems in
Recovery for Mental Harm in the Law of Torts, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1 (2001).
84 Id. at 6–7.
85 Id. at 39. But see Scott M. Eden, Note, I Am Having a Flashback . . . All the Way to
the Bank: The Application of the “Thin Skull” Rule to Mental Injuries—Poole v. Copland,
Inc., 24 N.C. CENT. L.J. 180, 181 (2001) (noting that “mental injury may be completely
subjective in its diagnosis, origin, and treatment,” and that extension of the “thin skull” rule
to these types of injuries “may create a flood of claims alleging that present outrageous
conduct has caused a past traumatic event to resurface”).
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Mark Levy and Saul Rosenberg disagree, and maintain that mental harm
should not receive the same treatment as physical harms.86 They contend that an
overbroad eggshell plaintiff rule “confuse[s] subsequence with consequence”—
assigning liability for psychological injuries simply on the basis of causation-infact grossly oversimplifies the underlying causes of such injuries.87
Using Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder88 as an example, Levy and
Rosenberg argue that the eggshell plaintiff rule is inadequate to explain the
“complex constellation of interdependent factors that contribute to actual, as
well as merely alleged, mental damages.”89 They suggest that potential eggshell
plaintiffs undergo thorough investigations of their lives prior to and after any
injury sustained due to negligent conduct.90 Such inquiries would produce a “far
more scientifically accurate” determination of whether the alleged harms arose
from the defendant’s conduct or from the plaintiff’s preexisting mental
condition.91 Levy and Rosenberg’s proposed approach resists automatic burden
shifting and seeks to achieve a reliable method for calculating damages.92
Another current—and controversial—debate surrounds the eggshell
plaintiff rule’s application to religious beliefs. Some commentators argue that
the rule should not extend to damages that result from a person’s religious
86 Mark I. Levy & Saul E. Rosenberg, The “Eggshell Plaintiff” Revisited: Causation of

Mental Damages in Civil Litigation, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 204, 204
(2003).
87 Id. at 205.
88 As Levy and Rosenberg explain:
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) may develop 30 days or so after a person
experiences a life-threatening event that engenders extreme feelings of helplessness,
fear, or horror. PTSD is the only psychiatric diagnosis where causation is implied by the
diagnosis, that is, the condition is assumed to be a reaction to the life-threatening event
that preceded it. Consequently, it is one of the few psychiatric conditions where the
concept of a mentally fragile plaintiff possessing particular vulnerabilities or “risk
factors” may indeed apply.

Id.
89 Id. But see Rachel V. Rose et al., Another Crack in the Thin Skull Plaintiff Rule: Why

Women with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Who Suffer Physical Harm from Abusive
Environments at Work or School Should Recover from Employers and Educators, 20 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 165, 168 (2011) (arguing that “abusive behavior in educational and work
environments can cause physical harm to PTSD sufferers and open the negligent actors up to
tort law liability under the universally accepted ‘thin skull’ plaintiff rule”).
90 Levy & Rosenberg, supra note 86, at 205–06.
91 Id. at 206.
92 See id. In addition to causation issues, scholars also have considered the more
fundamental question of the rule’s fairness in psychological cases. See EMERGING ISSUES IN
TORT LAW, supra note 65, at 127 (suggesting that psychiatric harm and physical injury
appear to be distinct forms of damages in cases where the plaintiff suffers a minor physical
injury but has a “constitutional predisposition to psychiatric harm,” undercutting the
rationale for applying the eggshell plaintiff rule to mental injuries).
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convictions (e.g., a refusal to accept blood transfusions).93 Others suggest that
religious beliefs constitute an integral component of each human being,
analogous to preexisting mental and physical conditions.94 As such, injuries
exacerbated by religious strictures should qualify for additional damages under
the eggshell plaintiff rule.95 Although the debate is far from settled, courts
considering this issue have so far refused to include religious beliefs in the
category of preexisting conditions that trigger the eggshell plaintiff rule.96
Most recently, discussion has focused on the eggshell plaintiff rule’s
implications in the media age. For example, Annika Martin argues that the rule
should be extended to victims of pro-eating disorder websites, to hold those
websites liable for exacerbating eating disorders.97 Martin notes that other
media tort cases have considered the psychological state of victims, and
contends that viewers of pro-eating disorder websites are eggshell victims due
to their psychological vulnerabilities.98

93 See, e.g., Beth Linea Carlson, Comment, “Blood and Judgment”: Inconsistencies
Between Criminal and Civil Courts When Victims Refuse Blood Transfusions, 33 STETSON
L. REV. 1067, 1081–82 (2004) (arguing that, unlike preexisting physical or mental
conditions, religious beliefs are based on voluntary and conscious reasoning and thus should
not give rise to eggshell vulnerability).
94 See, e.g., Anne C. Loomis, Comment, Thou Shalt Take Thy Victim as Thou Findest
Him: Religious Conviction as a Pre-existing State Not Subject to the Avoidable
Consequences Doctrine, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 473, 493–98 (2007); Jennifer Parobek,
Note, God v. The Mitigation of Damages Doctrine: Why Religion Should Be Considered a
Pre-Existing Condition, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 107, 110 (2007); Jeremy Pomeroy, Note, Reason,
Religion, and Avoidable Consequences: When Faith and the Duty to Mitigate Collide, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1111, 1152 (1992); see also Marc Ramsay, The Religious Beliefs of Tort
Victims: Religious Thin Skulls or Failures of Mitigation?, 20 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE
399, 400 (2007) (arguing that “religious victims’ choices occur within a highly protected
zone of personal choice” and, as a result, “constitutional commitments to religious freedom
and equality require us to treat these choices as reasonable ones”).
95 See Pomeroy, supra note 94, at 1156.
96 See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Bright, 658
N.Y.S.2d 910, 915 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); see also TWERSKI & HENDERSON, supra note 70,
at 259 (“While the thin skull rule encompasses most injuries flowing directly from the
defendant’s negligent conduct, plaintiffs who suffer special injuries as a result of religious
beliefs or past mental trauma may not take advantage of the rule.”).
97 Annika K. Martin, “Stick a Toothbrush Down Your Throat”: An Analysis of the
Potential Liability of Pro-eating Disorder Websites, 14 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 151, 173–74
(2005). According to Martin, “pro-eating disorder” websites include sections that list low
calorie foods, and provide advice on how to avoid eating and hide an eating disorder. Id. at
155. Additionally, the websites generally include “‘inspiring’ photographs of extremely thin
celebrities and fashion models.” Id. at 155 n.19.
98 Id. at 174. Although Martin admits that it would be difficult to determine whether the
harm resulted from a particular website or from plaintiff’s preexisting condition, she
nonetheless concludes that defendants operating such websites could potentially be liable for
some of the harm under the existing eggshell plaintiff rule. Id.
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In sum, the eggshell plaintiff rule is now a universally accepted principle,
although the rule’s exact scope remains in flux. Under the rule, defendants take
plaintiffs as they find them and are liable for the full extent of the harm they
cause. Liability is based on plaintiffs’ preexisting physical and mental makeup,
not on the foreseeable extent of damages.

III. EGGSHELL ECONOMICS: EXAMINING THE RULE’S BEHAVIORAL
INCENTIVES
With this background in mind, we examine the behavioral incentives of the
eggshell plaintiff rule. We start by articulating the need for an economic
analysis of the rule.99 Next, we outline the basic economic argument in favor of
eggshell liability: the rule arguably preserves tort law’s deterrence function by
tying damages to actual harm, ensuring that injurers internalize the full cost of
their actions.100 We then critique this argument by describing the ways in which
the eggshell plaintiff rule misaligns private and social incentives.101 Our
discussion initially focuses on the rule’s effect on the incentives of injurers,102
and then examines its effect on victims’ incentives.103 We conclude that the
eggshell plaintiff rule misaligns parties’ incentives in socially undesirable ways.

A. Revisiting the Rule: The Need for an Economic Analysis
The American tort system serves three primary policy goals: deterrence of
wrongful conduct, corrective justice, and victim compensation.104 Historically,
tort law played an especially important role in making victims whole, as
insurance markets did not develop until the late nineteenth century, and
plaintiffs had no other means of obtaining compensation for their injuries.105
Despite the extensive development of insurance markets in the twentieth
century, there remains a strong belief today that one of the primary purposes of
99 See
100 See
101 See
102 See
103 See
104 See

infra Part III.A.
infra Part III.B.
infra Part III.C–D.
infra Part III.C.
infra Part III.D.
F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 445–47 (2006); Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort Reform
Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and
Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 638–39 (1988); see also SHAVELL, supra note
22, at 268 (noting that tort law is rooted in the “classical and intuitively appealing notion of
corrective justice, that a wrongdoer should compensate his victim”).
105 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 269; see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1926
(1991) (“Liability insurance was poorly developed in the middle of the nineteenth century.
Weak actuarial data and the regionalism of insurance markets limited opportunities to
diversify risks.”).
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tort law is to “restore injured parties to their original condition, insofar as the
law can do this, by compensating them for their injury.”106
Because the eggshell plaintiff rule exemplifies the notions of victim
compensation and corrective justice, several scholars view the rule as
“expressly moral.”107 And yet application of the rule can be anything but fair.
Depending on the case, one’s sense of justice could favor a slightly negligent
injurer who faces financial ruin if forced to fully compensate the victim for
unforeseeable, extraordinary losses. In Bartolone v. Jeckovich,108 for example, a
driver in a car accident was ordered to pay $500,000 because the injured
driver’s “relatively minor” whiplash progressed into a debilitating mental
disorder.109 Given the facts of the case, one could reasonably argue that the
outcome was unjust.
More than a century has passed since courts began using the eggshell
plaintiff rule.110 Rather than continuing to assume the rule’s veracity, courts and
scholars should critically examine the rule’s behavioral incentives. We do so
through an economic approach, which focuses primarily on reducing risk
through the adoption of legal rules that deter harmful conduct and provide
incentives toward safety.111
Economic analysis takes into account several principles that are not always
considered by a traditional tort law analysis. Most notably, it seeks to maximize
social welfare, defined as the sum of the benefits from a particular action, minus
its social costs.112 Liability is set at a level that ensures that the only persons
who engage in a particular activity are those who obtain more utility from their
actions than the harm they cause to society.113 Under an economic approach, the
106 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND

MATERIALS 1–2 (12th ed. 2010).
107 Camille A. Nelson, Considering Tortious Racism, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 905,
957 (2005) (explaining the theory that “the innocent plaintiff, however vulnerable or
peculiar, should not bear the costs of the accident”); see also Dennis Klimchuk, Causation,
Thin Skulls and Equality, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 115, 116 (1998) (arguing that “the
principle of equality requires that we adopt the thin skull rule”).
108 481 N.Y.S.2d 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
109 Id. at 546.
110 See Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891).
111 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 268 (noting that “if the liability system has a real
purpose today, it must lie in the creation of incentives to reduce risk”); see also W. KIP
VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 89–94 (1991) (arguing that tort liability should
be imposed when there is “a failure to fully appreciate the risks that are present”).
112 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product
Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1440 n.7 (2010) (summarizing the “social welfaremaximizing” goal underlying the economic analysis of the law, with citations to several
leading authorities).
113 Importantly, the economic approach recognizes that “not all injuries can or even
should be deterred”—in other words, some activity is desirable even though it will result in
harm as well. Dustin E. Buehler & Steve P. Calandrillo, Baseball’s Moral Hazard: Law,
Economics, and the Designated Hitter Rule, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2083, 2096 (2010); Steve P.
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primary goal of our liability system is the optimal alignment of private and
social behavioral incentives—not compensation of victims per se—because
accident insurance is widely available to accomplish the latter purpose.114

B. The Basic Argument in Favor of the Eggshell Plaintiff Rule
The few scholars who have briefly examined the economics of eggshell
plaintiffs assume that the current rule properly aligns injurers’ incentives.115
Richard Posner and Steven Shavell cite the rule in support of their general
argument that tort damages should equal the actual harm caused by injurers.116
By tying damages to actual harm (rather than a “foreseeable” level of harm),
liability rules ensure that injurers fully internalize the harm they cause,
preserving tort law’s deterrence function even when multiple levels of harm are
possible.117
A simple unilateral accident model illustrates the economic allure of the
eggshell plaintiff rule as part of a damages-equal-actual-harm approach.118
Suppose that someone owns a vicious (but beloved) dog that is prone to biting
people.119 Assume that 90% of victims would sustain “normal” damages of
$100 from a dog bite, and that 10% would suffer $10,000 in damages because

Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to
Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 979 (2001); see also SHAVELL,
supra note 22, at 179 (noting that “the optimal level of care may well not result in the lowest
possible level of expected accident losses”).
114 See MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS 42 (1995) (“First-party health
and/or accident insurance is now widely available to many potential victims, usually through
the relatively efficient mechanism of group policies maintained by employers.”); see also
Douglas H. Cook, Personal Responsibility and the Law of Torts, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1245,
1266–68 (1996) (discussing the utilization and availability of insurance).
115 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 22, at 238–39; SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 236–37.
116 POSNER, supra note 22, at 238; SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 236–37; see also Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1333 (2001)
(referencing the argument that “the valuations employed in measuring tort damages or in
performing cost-benefit analysis . . . should reflect actual harm rather than victims’
uninformed ex ante estimates”).
117 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 236–37 (noting that if damages fall short of actual
harm, incentives to reduce risk will be inadequate, and if expected damages exceed harm,
incentives to reduce risk will be too high). This calculation also assumes “rational” actors.
“That is, they are forward looking and behave so as to maximize their expected utility.” Id.
at 1.
118 In unilateral accidents, “the actions of injurers but not of victims are assumed to
affect the probability or severity of losses.” Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1980). In bilateral accident scenarios, “potential victims
as well as injurers may influence the probability or magnitude of accident losses.” Id. at 6.
119 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 197 (describing a similar hypothetical).
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they are particularly vulnerable to bites (e.g., they are unusually susceptible to
bacterial infections, or have brittle skin or bones).120
Suppose also that the owner’s willingness to walk her dog in less populated
areas of the city affects the probability of dog bites. If the owner exercises no
care and walks the dog in her heavily populated neighborhood, there is a 30%
chance of a dog bite. Alternatively, for a cost of $10 the owner can exercise a
moderate level of care by driving to a less dense neighborhood,121 which
reduces the probability of a dog bite to 10%. And for a cost of $20, the owner
can exercise a high level of care by driving to a remote area of town, reducing
the chance of a dog bite to 5%.122
The following table shows the expected accident losses and social costs
associated with the levels of care described above123:
Table 1: Level of Care, Accidents, and Social Costs
Level of
Care

Cost of
Care

Accident
Probability

None

0

30%

Moderate

10

10%

High

20

5%

Expected
Accident Losses
30% x (90% x 100
+ 10% x 10,000)
= 327
10% x (90% x 100
+ 10% x 10,000)
= 109
5% x (90% x 100
+ 10% x 10,000)
= 54.5

Total
Social Costs
0 + 327
= 327
10 + 109
= 119
20 + 54.5
= 74.5

The table illustrates that it is socially desirable for the owner to exercise a
high level of care by driving to a remote area of town—the total social cost of
doing so is $74.50 (the $20 cost of care plus $54.50 in expected accident losses
to both normal and eggshell victims).124 These social costs are significantly less
120 These assumptions regarding the severity of harm and the proportion of normal

versus eggshell victims are purely hypothetical; we use them merely to illustrate one
possible outcome under our model. Obviously policymakers should adjust these numbers to
reflect available accident data.
121 The hypothetical $10 cost of care could conceivably include the cost of gas, vehicle
depreciation, lost time, etc.
122 Assume for the sake of simplicity that the various probabilities of risk and costs of
care in this model are constant. In other words, the costs of care and associated probabilities
of dog bites are not affected by other variables, such as time of day, day of the week,
weather, etc.
123 For a similar model and table illustrating the relationship between the care of injurers
and accident risks, see SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 179.
124 See id. at 178 (identifying the “social goal” of an economic approach as the
“minimization of the sum of the costs of care and of expected accident losses”).
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than the social costs associated with no care ($327) or a moderate level of care
($119).125 Thus, the law should incentivize the owner to exercise a high level of
care in order to maximize social welfare.126
Assuming that a dog owner has perfect information regarding the relevant
costs of care and accident probabilities, the eggshell plaintiff rule will
incentivize her to exercise an optimal level of care.127 This is true regardless of
whether the rule is used in tandem with strict liability or negligence.128 If courts
apply the eggshell plaintiff doctrine with strict liability rules, the owner is liable
for all of the harm her dog causes, including any injuries to eggshell
plaintiffs.129 The owner will internalize the full social cost of her actions and
will exercise high care to minimize her total expected costs.130 And if courts
instead apply the eggshell plaintiff doctrine with negligence rules, that approach
also induces optimal behavior as long as courts set the due care standard to
equal high care.131 If that is the case, the dog owner will exercise a high level of
care to avoid liability altogether.132
In addition to the eggshell plaintiff rule’s effect on the level of care, the rule
arguably induces injurers to engage in an optimal level of activity, at least when
strict liability applies. Generally, it is socially desirable for an individual to
continue to engage in an activity as long as the utility he gains exceeds total
125 See id. (comparing the total social costs of various levels of care).
126 Although in our example it is socially optimal for the injurer to exercise the highest

possible level of care, this will not always be the case. If the marginal increase in the cost of
care exceeds the marginal decrease in expected accident losses, it is possible (and perhaps
likely) that the optimal level of care will be moderate, not high. See id. at 179.
127 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 238–39 (suggesting that the eggshell plaintiff rule
induces socially optimal behavior); SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 229 (discussing the effect of
parties’ misperception of risk and the level of due care).
128 In reality, most states have imposed some form of strict liability for dog bites,
although the law varies by jurisdiction. See Hilary M. Schwartzberg, Note, Tort Law in
Action and Dog Bite Liability: How the American Legal System Blocks Plaintiffs from
Compensation, 40 CONN. L. REV. 845, 857 (2008); Rebecca F. Wisch, Quick Overview of
Dog Bite Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CENTER (2004), http://www.animallaw.info/articles/
qvusdogbite.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
129 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 226–31 (outlining the economics of strict liability);
SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 179–80 (same).
130 Explained in more detail, the dog owner would exercise a high level of care under a
strict-liability-plus-eggshell-plaintiff-rule regime because the total expected cost of $74.50
(the $20 cost of care, plus $54.50 in expected liability resulting from accidents with 5%
probability) is less than the total expected cost of $327 if she exercises no care, and it is also
less than the total expected cost of $119 if she exercises a moderate level of care.
131 It is debatable whether courts actually set the due care standard at optimal levels. See
SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 224–29.
132 See Shavell, supra note 118, at 2 (noting that “under the negligence rule all that an
injurer needs to do to avoid the possibility of liability is to make sure to exercise due care if
he engages in his activity”); see also POSNER, supra note 22, at 213–17; SHAVELL, supra
note 22, at 180.
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social costs (costs of care plus expected accident losses).133 Using the example
described above, suppose that legal rules properly incentivize the dog owner to
exercise an optimal level of care—each time of day she walks her dog the cost
of care is $20, and expected accident losses are $54.50.134 Suppose also that the
dog owner derives $100 in utility the first time each day she walks her dog, $50
in utility the second time she walks her dog, and only $30 in utility the third
time she walks her dog.135
The following table shows the utility and total social costs associated with
the levels of activity described above136:
Table 2: Level of Activity, Utility, and Social Costs
Level of
Activity

Total
Utility

Cost of
Care

0

0

0

Expected
Accident
Losses
0

1

100

20

54.5

2

150

40

109

3

180

60

163.5

Total Cost
0
20 + 54.5
= 74.5
40 + 109
= 149
60 + 163.5
= 223.5

Utility Minus Cost
0
100 – 74.5
= 25.5
150 – 149
=1
180 – 223.5
= -43.5

This table illustrates that it is socially desirable for the owner to walk the
dog only once per day because that level of activity maximizes social welfare at
$25.50. Additional walks are socially undesirable because the increase in total
cost exceeds the marginal increase in the dog owner’s utility.137

133 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 193; see also T. Randolph Beard et al., Tort Liability for
Software Developers: A Law & Economics Perspective, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 199, 219 (2009) (noting that “when the level of activity is added to the model, the
social goal is to maximize social welfare; whereas before, the goal was simply to minimize
social cost”).
134 For sake of simplicity, we assume that any increase in the dog owner’s activity level
will lead to a proportional increase in both the cost of care and expected accident losses. In
other words, if the owner walks the dog once, the cost of care will be $20 and expected
accident losses will be $54.50; if she walks the dog twice, the cost of care and expected
accident losses will double to $40 and $109 respectively.
135 This reflects the reality that “marginal benefits diminish as the actor increases his
activity level . . . because the actor gains less in utility from an additional unit of the activity
as his activity level expands.” Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Public Nuisance Law and
the New Enforcement Actions, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 49 n.8 (2010).
136 For a similar model illustrating the relationship between activity levels, accident
losses, and social welfare, see SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 194–97.
137 See id. (comparing the total social costs of various levels of activity).
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From an economic standpoint, the eggshell plaintiff rule ensures optimal
levels of activity by forcing injurers to internalize the full cost of accident losses
(including losses suffered by vulnerable victims).138 Expected accident losses in
Table 2 include damages to eggshell dog-bite victims; thus, the dog owner
internalizes the full extent of harm caused by her activity. She will walk her dog
exactly once per day, which is socially optimal.
Note, however, that legal rules will induce a socially optimal level of
activity only in the context of strict liability.139 If negligence law applies
instead, exercise of due care will absolve the injurer from liability for accident
losses, and as a result the injurer will keep engaging in the activity as long as
the marginal increase in her utility exceeds the costs of care.140 Applied to our
example above, if the owner takes due care each time she walks her dog, she
will be absolved from negligence liability and will have no reason to consider
the accident losses resulting from her actions.141 As a result, a dog owner
subject to negligence liability will engage in a socially excessive level of
activity—she will walk her dog three times because she gains $180 in utility for
only $60 in care (the additional $163.50 in cost imposed on society is not her
problem).142 The presence or absence of the eggshell plaintiff rule does not
affect the dog owner’s behavior in this scenario because she has no reason to
consider expected accident losses.143
In sum, the main economic argument in support of the eggshell plaintiff
rule is that the rule ensures that tort damages equal actual harm, incentivizing
injurers to exercise an optimal level of care. In the context of strict liability, the

138 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 238–39 (suggesting that the eggshell plaintiff rule
induces socially optimal behavior).
139 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 196–99.
140 See id. at 196 (noting that injurers who take due care under a negligence regime
“have no reason to consider the effect that engaging in their activity has on accident losses”);
Beard et al., supra note 133, at 220 (“Since [negligence] liability is unaffected by the activity
level, the injurer selects an activity level that is too high (activity continues as long as total
utility rises more than care costs with additional activity).”).
141 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 196.
142 Perhaps courts could guard against this socially undesirable effect by factoring
activity levels into the due care standard for negligence. For a discussion on the feasibility of
doing so, see, for example, Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of
Activity Levels in Negligence Law, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 327–37 (1992) (arguing that
courts often incorporate activity levels into the negligence inquiry); and LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 17, at 69–71 (arguing that courts do not incorporate activity levels into
negligence determinations, because it is costly to evaluate activity levels).
143 Ultimately, this reflects a defect in the negligence approach in general, rather than a
defect in the eggshell plaintiff rule in particular. See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 198 (“The
failing of the negligence rule results from an implicit assumption that the standard of
behavior for determining negligence is defined only in terms of the level of care, an
assumption that seems generally to be true in reality.” (footnote omitted)).
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rule arguably also incentivizes injurers to engage in a socially optimal level of
activity.

C. Perverse Consequences from the Best of Intentions: Misalignment of
Injurers’ Incentives
The argument for the eggshell plaintiff rule is less persuasive when one
considers other economic consequences of the rule, however. We argue that
eggshell liability significantly misaligns the incentives of both injurers and
victims. Looking first to the incentives of injurers, the eggshell plaintiff rule
subjects injurers to unfair surprise,144 fails to incentivize socially optimal
behavior when injurers have imperfect information about expected accident
losses,145 and fails to account for the effects of risk aversion, moral hazard, and
the judgment-proof problem.146

1. Unfair Surprise: The Rule’s Stark Contrast with Contract Law
The most problematic feature of the eggshell plaintiff rule is that it subjects
injurers to unfair surprise.147 When the rule comes into play, injurers must fully
compensate victims, even if the extent of the injury is unusual, bizarre, or
perhaps completely unforeseeable.148 In such cases, holding the injurer liable
for the full extent of the eggshell plaintiff’s unforeseeable injuries “may impose
a ruinous liability which no private fortune could meet, and which is out of all
proportion to the defendant’s fault.”149

144 See infra Part III.C.1.
145 See infra Part III.C.2.
146 See infra Part III.C.3.
147 Once a court concludes that the defendant is at fault, the eggshell plaintiff rule

applies without mercy: “the defendant does not escape liability for the unforeseeable
personal reactions of the plaintiff.” DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 63, at 222.
148 See R.E.T. Corp. v. Frank Paxton Co., 329 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Iowa 1983) (“[T]ort
damages are not limited by the reasonable contemplations of the parties. . . . [T]he amount of
direct injury is compensated, whether its extent was contemplated or not.”); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 291 (noting that it is “as if a magic circle were drawn about the [eggshell
plaintiff], and one who breaks it, even by so much as a cut on the finger, becomes liable for
all resulting harm to the person, although it may be death”).
149 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, at 293 (footnote omitted). In contrast to the eggshell
plaintiff rule’s logic, numerous decisions abound with statements to the effect that “the
punishment should fit the crime,” and indeed often explicitly reference the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g.,
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 n.24 (1996) (“The principle that
punishment should fit the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law
jurisprudence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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In contrast to tort law’s eggshell plaintiff rule, the avoidance of unfair
surprise is a fundamental principle for damage assessments in contract law.150
As every first-year law student knows, the seminal case of Hadley v.
Baxendale151 lays out the rule that contract damages are recoverable only if they
are foreseeable. That foreseeability may come either generally (because the loss
arises naturally from defendants’ breach of contract) or specially (because
“special circumstances . . . were communicated by the plaintiff[s] to the
defendant[s], and thus known to both parties”).152
Hadley’s rule is based on the rationale that the victim often is in a better
position than the injurer to avoid the consequences of a breach of contract, even
if the victim cannot prevent the breach herself.153 The victim may communicate
her vulnerability to the breacher, thus putting the breacher on notice of the
potential consequential damages; or the victim may take extra precautions
herself to avoid those damages.154
It is not immediately clear why Hadley’s rationale should not also apply in
the context of tort injuries.155 Injurers are not on notice of the potentially
catastrophic injuries that eggshell victims suffer from seemingly routine
actions.156 Moreover, injurers are held liable even when victims know of their
preexisting conditions or unusual vulnerabilities and are in a far better position
to avoid harm.157 The current rule does not consider whether an eggshell victim
can take extra precautions to protect herself, whether she can communicate her
condition to others, or whether she can take other actions to notify injurers of
her vulnerabilities.158
150 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 158–59.
151 (1854) 26 Eng. Rep. 398 (Exch.).
152 Id. at 402.
153 POSNER, supra note 22, at 159.
154 The general principle excusing a party from liability for consequential damages if the

risk of loss is known only to the other party creates incentives to allocate risk in the most
efficient manner. This is so because if the party with knowledge of the risk is the most
efficient preventer of the loss, he will take precautions to reduce the risk; if this party
believes that the other party might be the most efficient preventer of loss, he will reveal the
risk to the other party and pay him to prevent it. See id. at 158–59. But cf. Louis Wolcher,
Price Discrimination and Inefficient Risk Allocation Under the Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,
12 RES. L. & ECON. 9, 9–26 (1989) (modeling Hadley’s rule in a less-than-competitive
market and finding that the incentive to provide information about unforeseeable losses can
be inefficient, because once a provider with market power knows the plaintiff’s special
vulnerability to losses, he is in a position to extract that plaintiff’s consumer surplus).
155 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 158–59 (raising this issue).
156 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, at 293 (noting that it is “inconceivable that any
defendant should be held liable to infinity for all of the consequences which flow from a
single act”).
157 See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
158 For example, one of the authors recalls the first time he went skiing in California.
Several blind skiers were enjoying the slopes while wearing bright orange vests. The blind
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2. Imperfect Information, Levels of Care, and Levels of Activity
Injurers also likely have imperfect information ex ante about expected
eggshell losses, which can misalign their incentives in a socially undesirable
way.159 The following discussion illustrates this effect by examining the
behavioral incentives of two types of injurers: those who are entirely ignorant of
possible eggshell damages, and those who are partially ignorant of possible
eggshell damages. As we shall see, the eggshell plaintiff rule fails to incentivize
optimal behavior in both situations.
First, let us examine behavioral incentives when injurers are completely
(and reasonably) ignorant of the harm they might cause (e.g., a student
negligently kicks a classmate in the shin, not expecting any harm, but the kick
shatters the classmate’s leg due to a latent brittle-bone disease).160 Because this
“reasonable” injurer is unaware of the possibility that he is striking an eggshell
plaintiff, he will not factor the probability and severity of eggshell damages into
his decision calculus.161 As a result, the injurer likely will take too little care
and engage in too much activity.162
To illustrate this point, we revisit our model from the previous section.163
Suppose that the owner of the vicious dog is entirely ignorant of the fact that
10% of dog-bite victims will suffer eggshell damages of $10,000.164 Instead, the
owner reasonably (but incorrectly) believes that all victims will suffer $100 in
damages. The following table illustrates the effect that this incorrect belief has
on the dog owner’s level of care:

skiers presumably wore these vests to notify sighted skiers around them of their condition in
order to avoid accidents.
159 Cf. Robert A. Mikos, “Eggshell” Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal
Benefits of Shifting Crime, 105 MICH. L. REV. 307, 345–47 (2006) (discussing information
distortions in the context of eggshell victims of crimes).
160 See Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891). It is worth noting that the
same situation would result if injurers are unaware that the law holds them liable for
eggshell damages. We do not address this “ignorance of the law” situation, because all laws
are subject to the same critique. See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 563 (“If a person is held
liable for violating well-appreciated laws or laws that can be learned through reasonable
effort, he will have an incentive to learn the laws and adhere to them.”).
161 In an ideal world, “[a] risk-neutral party makes decisions on the basis of probabilitydiscounted, or expected, values.” SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 178. Inaccurate information
obviously would affect the optimality of these decisions.
162 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 236–37 (noting that if damages fall short of actual
harm, incentives to reduce risk are inadequate).
163 See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
164 This mirrors reality—most injurers likely are completely ignorant of the possibility
of excessive damages for relatively rare eggshell vulnerabilities. See Tali Nachshoni &
Moshe Kotler, Legal and Medical Aspects of Body Dysmorphic Disorder, 26 MED. & L. 721,
731 (2007) (noting that “eggshell skulls are fortunately rare in medicine”).
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Table 3: Level of Care if the Injurer Is Ignorant of Eggshell
Victims
Level of
Care

Cost of
Care

Accident
Probability

None

0

30%

Moderate

10

10%

High

20

5%

Perceived Accident
Losses
30% x (100% x 100)
= 30
10% x (100% x 100)
= 10
5% x (100% x 100)
=5

Perceived
Costs
0 + 30
= 30
10 + 10
= 20
20 + 5
= 25

Although our prior discussion demonstrated that it is socially optimal for
the dog owner to take high care,165 Table 3 shows that when injurers are
completely ignorant of the possibility of eggshell damages, they will exercise a
socially inadequate level of care. Because the owner is unaware of the
possibility that her dog might bite eggshell victims, her ex ante perception of
expected accident losses is too low,166 and she mistakenly believes that it is in
her interest to take moderate care, not high care.167
Moreover, ignorance of the possibility of eggshell damages makes it likely
that injurers will engage in socially excessive levels of activity. The following
table illustrates the effect that the dog owner’s ignorance of eggshell victims
would have on her level of activity, assuming that her ignorance indeed leads
her to exercise a moderate level of care.

165 See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
166 If the dog owner is aware that there is a 10% chance that a dog-bite victim will suffer

$10,000 in damages and a 90% chance that a victim will suffer $100 in damages, she knows
that the expected harm from each bite is $1,090. But if the owner instead mistakenly thinks
that all victims will suffer $100 in damages, then she perceives that the harm from each bite
is $100—an amount that is not even 10% of the actual expected harm.
167 Stated another way, if injurers are completely ignorant of the possibility of eggshell
plaintiffs, then the eggshell plaintiff rule has no effect on injurers’ behavior.
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Table 4: Level of Activity if the Injurer Is Ignorant of Eggshell
Victims
Level of
Activity

Total
Utility

Cost of
Care

0

0

0

Perceived
Accident
Losses
0

1

100

10

10

2

150

20

20

3

180

30

30

Perceived
Total Cost
0
10 + 10
= 20
20 + 20
= 40
30 + 30
= 60

Perceived
Utility Minus
Cost
0
100 – 20
= 80
150 – 40
= 110
180 – 60
= 120

Although our previous discussion demonstrated that it is socially optimal
for the dog owner to walk her dog only once,168 Table 4 shows that when
injurers are completely ignorant of the possibility of eggshell damages, they
will engage in socially excessive levels of activity. The dog owner’s ignorance
of the full extent of damages induces her to choose a less expensive (and
socially inadequate) level of care and leads her to underestimate expected
accident losses.169 This makes it more likely that the marginal increase in the
owner’s utility from each walk exceeds her perception of the total costs.170 As a
result, the dog owner mistakenly believes that it is in her interest to walk her
dog three times, rather than once.171
Second, the eggshell plaintiff rule also fails to induce optimal behavior in
the modified unforeseeability scenario—where injurers have some knowledge
of eggshell plaintiffs but are partially ignorant of the probability or extent of
eggshell damages.172 This group represents the functional interpretation of
168 See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
169 If the dog owner assumes that all victims will suffer $100 in damages and is ignorant

of the fact that 10% of victims will suffer $10,000 in damages, she will significantly
underestimate expected accident losses—she will wrongly conclude that expected accident
losses are only $100, instead of $1,090. Because the dog owner underestimates accident
losses, there is a greater chance that she will conclude that a lower (and cheaper) level of
care minimizes her losses. See supra notes 124–26, 166–67 and accompanying text.
170 In our example, the dog owner wrongly believes that expected accident losses
increase by only $10 each time she walks her dog. Thus, the increases in her marginal utility
(ranging from $100 the first time she walks her dog, to $30 the third time she walks her dog)
will always justify additional activity.
171 As Table 4 illustrates, the owner mistakenly believes that her marginal utility will be
maximized when she walks her dog for the third time (which she believes will yield $120 in
utility-minus-costs, exceeding the net utility of $80 for one walk and $110 for two walks).
172 This scenario is probably the most common. Many injurers probably are aware that
eggshell victims are out there, but they have little or no idea how likely it is that they will
encounter an eggshell victim. See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 481 (noting that “individuals
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existing law—in practice, “unforeseeable damages” are not damages that are
impossible to foresee; the term actually describes damages that a reasonable
person would fail to foresee.173 The partial-knowledge scenario will encompass
situations in which the injurer is aware that he is on the hook for eggshell
damages but is guessing about the probability and amount of those damages.174
Injurers in this category likely will misestimate the expected damages from
their activity.175 Whether injurers with partial knowledge overestimate or
underestimate damages (and to what extent) depends on a variety of factors and
is the subject of much scholarly debate.176 Regardless of whether injurers
overestimate or underestimate the probability and severity of harm, their partial
knowledge will lead them to act sub-optimally, decreasing social welfare.177
The previous model illustrates this conclusion with respect to the
underestimation of damages.178 One can extrapolate scenarios from that model
often experience difficulty in assessing and interpreting probabilities, especially small
ones”).
173 JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 417 (3d ed.
2002). The term “unforeseeable damages” is therefore subject to the same limitations as the
words “reasonable” and “foreseeable.” See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99,
103 (N.Y. 1928).
174 See WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS,
MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 147 (2004) (examining the gap between media
presentation of tort cases and the actual cases).
175 See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 660–63 (2d.
ed. 1997) (“[S]ituations involving risk and uncertainty are also well known for the irrational
decisions that they may generate. . . . This pattern of overreaction and underreaction suggests
that market decisions will seldom be optimal.”).
176 Compare SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 227 (“[U]ncertainty will tend to induce parties
to take higher than desirable levels of care to guard against being found liable by mistake.”),
and Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The
Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 724 (2008) (“Notwithstanding
evidence of overconfidence, people tend to overestimate the chance of ‘available’
risks. . . . [I]nclud[ing] recent events that have received lots of publicity.”), with Christine
Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653,
1663 (1998) (“It is difficult to come up with examples of events giving rise to individual
liability the probability of which is likely to be overestimated rather than (as suggested
above) underestimated.”), and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is
Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 671
n.5 (1994) (“[T]here is no compelling reason to assume that their guesses would be too low
rather than too high.”).
177 Of course, one could argue that the overestimations and underestimations will
average out. But this scenario seems unlikely. And even if injurers’ misestimations do
average out, that result is the product of chance and thus inferior to a rule that properly
incentivizes individuals to maximize social welfare. See David Rosenberg, MandatoryLitigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 874
(2002) (noting that “[b]ecause offsetting distortions will occur only by coincidence,” courts
should reject a legal rule that relies on such an outcome).
178 See supra notes 164–71 and accompanying text.
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in which injurers overestimate harm (i.e., injurers exercise a socially excessive
level of care and engage in undesirably low levels of activity).179 Either way,
imperfect information makes it likely that incentives are sub-optimal under the
existing eggshell plaintiff rule.

3. Risk Aversion, Moral Hazard, and Judgment-Proof Problems
Aside from imperfect information about the probability and severity of
accidents involving eggshell victims, other unintended consequences of the
eggshell plaintiff rule can induce injurers to take socially undesirable actions.
Pitfalls include and result from the reality of risk aversion, moral hazard, and
the judgment-proof problem.
First, risk aversion may induce injurers to exercise socially excessive levels
of care or socially inadequate levels of activity.180 Risk-averse individuals are
“uncomfortable with volatility or uncertainty,”181 and are unwilling to bear risk
even in situations in which it would be actuarially fair to do so.182 Injurers tend
to be risk averse when they engage in conduct that could result in serious injury
and large damages awards—conduct that “would be likely to cause losses that
179 As the perceived harm increases, injurers will be more likely to exercise a higher
level of care to reduce the risk of that harm. Increases in perceived harm also make it more
likely that perceived accident losses will exceed the utility that injurers gain from various
levels of activity.
An excellent real-world illustration of the fact that eggshell damages can lead injurers to
dramatically reduce activity levels below the social optimum arises in the context of
vaccinations. While everyone knows that routine childhood immunizations benefit 99+% of
our population and have prevented literally millions of deaths, it is also true that a small
minority of recipients will experience adverse effects, like allergic reactions, seizures, or
even death in extremely rare cases. The expansion of tort liability against vaccine
manufacturers in the 1960s and 1970s drove dozens of companies out of business, to the
point where the medical community was concerned that essential vaccines would become
unavailable. Congress finally acted to correct the problem in 1986, passing the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. See Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are
So Many Americans Opting out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 MICH. J.L. REFORM 353,
408–11 (2004). This Act created an insurance pool to compensate the few victims of
childhood immunizations, while making it far more difficult to bring tort cases, where
lottery-like damages had been bankrupting manufacturers. Id.
180 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 260; see also John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the
Small and the Large, 32 ECONOMETRICA 122, 122 (1964) (discussing risk aversion). But see
Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Lowry, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV.
1644, 1644 (2002) (noting circumstances in which individuals prefer risk).
181 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (9th ed. 2009).
182 KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 90 (1974). For
example, “[a] risk-averse person would pay to avoid a risk, such as one involving a 50
percent chance of losing $1,000 and a 50 percent chance of winning $1,000.” SHAVELL,
supra note 22, at 258. For these people, “losses loom larger than gains.” Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA
263, 279 (1979).
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are significant in relation to their assets.”183 If liability insurance is unavailable,
risk-averse injurers are forced to bear risk.184 To avoid (or reduce) this risk,
they tend to exercise socially excessive levels of care or engage in socially
inadequate levels of activity.185
The eggshell plaintiff rule could induce precisely this type of behavior
among uninsured risk-averse injurers, especially in the context of strict liability.
The rule requires injurers to compensate eggshell victims for the full extent of
their damages;186 thus, injurers are exposed to the possibility of large damages
awards.187 If strict liability applies and insurance is unavailable, risk-averse
injurers will exercise an excessive level of care and also will curb their level of
activity.188 Note, however, that this undesirable effect among risk-averse
injurers arguably would be limited to the context of strict liability; if negligence
rules apply, injurers can avoid the risk of large damages awards by exercising
due care.189
Conversely, if liability insurance is available, injurers may exercise
inadequate care levels or engage in socially excessive activity levels if the
presence of insurance creates a moral hazard effect.190 Moral hazard refers to
“the tendency for an insured party to take less care to avoid an insured loss than
the party would have taken if the loss had not been insured, or even to act

183 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 258. In contrast, injurers tend to be risk neutral when
faced with the prospect of liability for small losses. Id. Most persons are risk averse to some
extent. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53
AM. ECON. REV. 941, 959 (1963) (characterizing individuals as “normally risk-averters”).
184 See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
603, 669 (2006); Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1265 (2004).
185 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 260.
186 STEIN, supra note 42.
187 See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 534
(2003) (noting that the eggshell plaintiff rule exposes defendants to “large damage awards
because of a hidden vulnerability in the plaintiff”).
188 Specifically, because uninsured injurers would be liable for the full extent of harm
under a strict-liability-plus-eggshell-plaintiff-rule regime, they would bear the full cost of
harm they inflict, as well as the risk associated with large damages awards. Injurers would
adjust both their level of care and level of activity to reduce this risk. See SHAVELL, supra
note 22, at 260.
189 This of course assumes that courts can accurately assess the optimal level of care in
various accident scenarios and that injurers are aware of that level of care—assumptions that
are not always true. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of
Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 806–13 (1983) (critiquing the “conventional theory” that
injurers can accurately identify the due care standard set by courts).
190 For a discussion of moral hazard, see, for example, CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE
RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS
(1985); Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
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intentionally to bring about that loss.”191 If insurers have difficulty observing
whether injurers take adequate precautions, insurance premiums will not reflect
injurers’ actual level of care and, more importantly, the exercise of care will not
lower premiums.192 In that situation, injurers are insured against losses
(including eggshell damages), and would have no premium-based incentive to
take care or curb excessive activity.193
Finally, the eggshell plaintiff rule will have little or no effect on the
behavior of judgment-proof injurers.194 Individuals are judgment-proof when
their assets are insufficient to pay for the accident losses they cause.195 When
injurers are judgment proof, they view losses exceeding their assets as merely
equaling their assets, and this in turn leads injurers to exercise inadequate levels
of care and excessive levels of activity.196 For example, if there is a possibility
of $100,000 in eggshell damages but the injurer only has $5,000 in assets, the
injurer will not be concerned with the risk of losses exceeding $5,000,
significantly diluting the incentives created by the eggshell plaintiff rule.197
In sum, the eggshell plaintiff rule fails to incentivize socially optimal
behavior among injurers for a variety of reasons. First, the rule subjects injurers
to unfair surprise. Second, injurers with no knowledge of eggshell plaintiffs will
still exercise too little care and engage in excessive levels of activity. Injurers
with some knowledge of eggshell plaintiffs will likely misestimate expected
damages and exercise sub-optimal care and activity levels (either too high or

191 Jacob Loshin, Note, Insurance Law’s Hapless Busybody: A Case Against the
Insurable Interest Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 474, 506 (2007).
192 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 262–63.
193 Id. at 263. But see Muhammad Masum Billah, Note, Economic Analysis of
Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability, 19 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 297, 312 (2007) (noting that
“insurers are able, by and large, to check the problem of moral hazard or under-deterrence
through various strategies such as partial coverage, deductibles, and differentiating premium
rates based on past loss experience”).
194 For a discussion of the judgment-proof problem, see generally Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure
of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 147 (1998); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Judgment
Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, and the Dark Side of Tort Liability, 52 STAN. L. REV. 73
(1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1999); Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45
(1986).
195 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 921 (9th ed. 2009) (defining judgment-proof as
“unable to satisfy a judgment for money damages because the person has no property, [or]
does not own enough property within the court’s jurisdiction to satisfy the judgment”).
196 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 230–31.
197 This scenario may be common because individuals have opportunities to protect their
assets from liability. See LoPucki, The Death of Liability, supra note 194, at 14–38
(describing various strategies individuals use to protect assets against liability). But see
Schwarcz, supra note 194, at 1 (“[A]n economic analysis of these transactions suggests that
widespread use of these judgment proofing techniques is unlikely.”).
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too low). Moreover, the rule fails to take into account the effects of risk
aversion, moral hazard, and judgment-proof injurers.

D. Misalignment of Victims’ Incentives
The discussion above assumes that accidents are unilateral in nature; in
reality, most accidents are bilateral, meaning that both injurers and victims can
take actions to reduce risk.198 In addition to the eggshell plaintiff rule’s creation
of sub-optimal incentives for injurers, the rule has a socially undesirable effect
on the behavior of victims as well—it dulls or may even eliminate eggshell
victims’ incentive to take care and self-protect against losses. For purposes of
this Article, victims can be separated into two categories: those who know of (or
reasonably should be expected to discover) their eggshell condition; and those
who do not know of (and reasonably should not be expected to discover) their
eggshell condition.199
As for the first category, we begin by analyzing those eggshell plaintiffs
who know of (or could discover) their eggshell condition and who can also selfprotect (by warning the injurer, wearing a helmet, ceasing to engage in a
particular activity, etc.).200 In these situations, the eggshell plaintiff rule fails to
incentivize efforts to discover and self-protect against eggshell conditions, and
actually perversely encourages the opposite result.
To illustrate why, we revisit our dog-bite example.201 Assume that the cost
for victims to discover whether they are particularly vulnerable to bites is
minimal—in other words, dog-bite victims either know or could easily discern
whether they are among the 90% of victims who would sustain “normal”
damages of $100 from a bite, or the 10% of vulnerable victims who would
suffer $10,000 in damages from a bite.202 Also assume that the dog owner will
198 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 183; Jennifer H. Arlen, Reconsidering Efficient Tort

Rules for Personal Injury: The Case of Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV.
41, 46 (1990); Ram Singh, ‘Causation-Consistent’ Liability, Economic Efficiency and the
Law of Torts, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 179, 181 (2007).
199 In reality, there could be a third group: victims who partially know about their
eggshell condition (and for whom it is unreasonable to expect complete knowledge of the
condition). We omit discussion of this group because the points made about victims with
complete knowledge also would apply to some extent to victims with partial knowledge.
200 For more discussion on the role of self-protection by victims, see, for example,
MARK F. GRADY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 90–95 (1994) (citing cases of victims’
self-protection as it relates to strict liability and negligence); Tomas J. Philipson & Richard
A. Posner, The Economic Epidemiology of Crime, 39 J.L. & ECON. 405, 411–22 (1996)
(discussing victims’ self-protection as it relates to criminal law).
201 See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
202 Situations in which victims would reasonably be expected to know about their
vulnerabilities are not uncommon. For example, many—perhaps even most—individuals
know whether they are allergic to bee stings, peanut butter, penicillin, and many other
common, everyday risks. Many individuals also know whether they have conditions that
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exercise an optimal level of care (high care, costing $20) and an optimal level of
activity (walking the dog once), which will minimize accident probability at
5%.203 If the dog bite is a unilateral accident only under the control of the dog
owner,204 the total expected social cost of each dog bite would be:
$20 + (5% x (90% x $100 + 10% x $10,000)) = $74.50
Suppose, however, that our dog-bite accident scenario is bilateral in nature,
and victims with knowledge of their eggshell condition could reduce damages
from a dog bite to a “normal” level of $100 by purchasing special anti-dog
Kevlar pants for $200.205 If this were the case, the total expected social cost of
each dog bite would change to206:
$20 + (10% x $200) + (5% x (100% x $100)) = $45
In this example, it is optimal for eggshell victims to buy Kevlar pants
because it reduces the expected social cost of dog bites from $74.50 to $45.207
This demonstrates that it is socially desirable for victims with relatively easy
access to knowledge of their eggshell condition to self-protect, when doing so
would reduce expected social costs.208
And yet the eggshell plaintiff rule induces precisely the opposite result, at
least in the context of strict liability: it removes the incentive for eggshell
victims to discover their condition, self-protect against losses, and reduce social
costs.209 When a strict-liability-plus-eggshell-plaintiff-rule regime applies, the
could aggravate accident damages, such as high blood pressure, alcoholism, a bad back, or a
weak immune system.
203 See supra notes 119–26, 134–37 and accompanying text.
204 Meaning, in this context, that only the injurer can take action to reduce expected
accident losses; the victim can do nothing. SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 178.
205 See Damien Stannard, Consumer Road Test—Kevlar Jeans, SUNDAY MAIL
(Adelaide, Austl.), May 22, 2011, at 85 (“Let’s face it, who hasn’t needed Kevlar pants at
some time in their past?”).
206 Because we assume that victims are aware of their vulnerabilities, we multiply the
cost of the Kevlar pants ($200) by the percentage of victims that have an eggshell condition
(10%) and thus would have a need for Kevlar pants.
207 Of course, it will not always be optimal for both injurers and victims to take care.
SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 182–83. In the hypothetical above, for example, it would not be
optimal for victims to take care if the Kevlar pants cost $1,000—if that were the case, the
total expected social cost of each dog bite would be: $20 + (10% x $1,000) + (5% x (100% x
$100)) = $125, which exceeds the social cost of $74.50 if victims take no care.
208 See id. at 182 (“The optimal levels of care of injurers and of victims will reflect their
joint possibilities for reducing accident risks and their costs of care.”). Again, this situation
assumes that the plaintiff is not ignorant of the law. See id. at 562–63.
209 Cf. POSNER, supra note 22, at 158–59 (describing, in the contract context, the
incentive effects of allowing a victim of breach to recover the full consequences of the
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victim knows she will be fully compensated for the full extent of her injuries,
whether they were foreseeable or not, and whether she could have avoided them
or not.210 Victims have no incentive to incur expenses ex ante that could reduce
losses.211
Note, however, that this effect on victims’ incentives is not as problematic
if either negligence rules apply or if victims are reasonably ignorant of their
eggshell condition.212 First, when negligence rules apply and those rules are
properly administered by courts (meaning the “due care” standard is set
optimally),213 the eggshell plaintiff rule likely has no positive or negative
effects on victims’ behavior.214 Injurers will exercise due care to avoid
liability,215 and the eggshell plaintiff rule will not apply.216 Instead, victims will
bear the risk of accident losses under a properly functioning negligence rule,
providing an incentive for them to discover their vulnerabilities, engage in
optimal levels of care and activity, and self-protect.217
Second, the eggshell plaintiff rule has no positive or negative effect on the
other category of victims in eggshell cases: those who are reasonably ignorant
of their vulnerable condition.218 In these circumstances, the presence or absence

breach despite the fact that such consequences were unforeseeable to the breacher of the
contract).
210 See, e.g., DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 63, at 222 (noting that under the eggshell
plaintiff rule, “the defendant does not escape liability for the unforeseeable personal
reactions of the plaintiff”).
211 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 184 (noting that, in the context of strict liability,
“victims will be fully compensated by injurers for accident losses” and “will not take care”).
212 This is similar to the effect of the eggshell plaintiff rule on injurers’ incentives,
which is problematic in the context of strict liability but less problematic in the context of
negligence. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.
213 See Alan J. Meese, The Externality of Victim Care, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1201, 1210
n.44 (2001) (“A negligence regime is ‘well-administered’ if, among other things, courts can
accurately determine each party’s level of ‘due care’ and whether the injurer satisfied that
standard.”).
214 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 185–86. Additionally, a regime of strict liability with the
defense of contributory negligence likely would preserve optimal incentives for victims to
take care. See id. at 184–85.
215 Id. at 185–86 (“[I]f the courts choose due care to equal the socially optimal level,
then injurers will be led to take due care.”).
216 See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 63, at 222 (noting that the eggshell plaintiff rule
does “not impose liability without fault”).
217 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 185–86, 202 (noting that victims exercise optimal
levels of care and activity if negligence rules apply). Additionally, the assumption of risk
doctrine disincentivizes victims from voluntarily assuming risk. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
218 For example, an eggshell plaintiff may have a latent condition that arises only when
she is injured by a tortfeasor. See, e.g., Reed v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 185 F.3d 712, 714,
716–17 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff with unknown, preexisting degenerative disk
condition was entitled to a jury instruction on the eggshell plaintiff rule). Alternatively,
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of eggshell liability has no bearing on victims’ ex ante behavior—a liability rule
will not affect victims’ incentives to take care or self-protect if those victims are
ignorant of their vulnerabilities.219
Ultimately, however, the eggshell plaintiff rule has an overall negative
effect on victims’ incentives. Although the rule is neutral when applied in the
context of negligence liability or to reasonably ignorant eggshell victims, it has
a negative impact when strict liability applies and victims know of or
reasonably could discover their vulnerabilities.

IV. A REVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO EGGSHELL LIABILITY
From an economic standpoint, the eggshell plaintiff rule has the potential to
create perverse behavioral incentives and thus be socially sub-optimal.220 To
better align these incentives, we argue that courts should adopt foreseeability as
the general rule for accidents involving vulnerable victims, bringing eggshell
cases within the traditional rules governing foreseeability and proximate
cause.221 We also argue that the goal of victim compensation can be
accomplished through private or social insurance markets, instead of the tort
system.222 Although the use of insurance to compensate eggshell victims gives
rise to potential problems,223 solutions exist.224 Lastly, if victims continue to be
compensated through the tort system (rather than through insurance markets),
courts should apply a foreseeability rule not only in eggshell cases, but in “steel
skull” cases as well.225

A. Foreseeability as the General Rule
As discussed above, injurers can only behave based on their expectations of
the harm or benefit of their actions; liability for unforeseeable eggshell damages
fails to incentivize optimal behavior in many cases.226 Injurers with imperfect
perhaps it is cost-prohibitive for the victim to discover her vulnerabilities, or prohibitively
expensive for the victim to self-protect against losses.
219 Stated another way, a victim who does not know she has a thin skull and who cannot
reasonably discover that condition will not care one way or another whether the eggshell
plaintiff rule exists.
220 See supra Part III.C–D.
221 See infra Part IV.A. In other words, it is time for courts to dispense with the
exceptional nature of eggshell cases. See, e.g., Bahr & Graham, supra note 13, at 418 (noting
that the eggshell plaintiff rule “has remained virtually untouched in the past century while
other basic notions of tort law have undergone significant alteration”).
222 See infra Part IV.B.
223 See infra Part IV.B.1.
224 See infra Part IV.B.2.
225 See infra Part IV.C.
226 See Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 344 (2007)
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knowledge of the probability and severity of eggshell injuries will misestimate
expected damages, leading them to exercise sub-optimal care and activity
levels.227 Risk aversion, moral hazard, and judgment-proof problems may
misalign injurers’ incentives even further.228 And eggshell victims have little or
no incentive to discover their vulnerabilities and self-protect under the current
rule.229
A rule holding injurers liable only for foreseeable damages substantially
mitigates these problems, and is superior to the current rule, for several
reasons.230 First, a foreseeability rule better aligns victims’ incentives by
forcing victims to bear any accident losses that result from unforeseeable
vulnerabilities.231 Eggshell victims would have an incentive to discover their
vulnerabilities and self-protect in order to minimize these losses.232
Second, although injurers would not internalize all the harm they cause
under a foreseeability rule (which normally would be a sub-optimal result),233
such a rule likely would not cause a significant deviation from optimal
incentives among injurers. Eggshell plaintiffs are—by definition—extremely
(“If [injuries] are unforeseeable, then there is no reason to believe defendants will be able,
correctly and cost-effectively, to determine what behaviors to engage in. The resulting risk is
that they will either under- or overestimate the expected costs of these unforeseeable
losses.”).
227 See supra notes 159–79 and accompanying text.
228 See supra notes 180–97 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 198–219 and accompanying text.
230 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW & ECONOMICS 644, 645 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (“Under
the normative economic analysis, the proximate cause doctrine’s designated role is to
expand or shrink the scope of liability, in order to achieve efficient deterrence.”).
As an aside, one should be careful to note that while we have generalized the concept of
foreseeability in this paper, it actually arises in three distinct places in traditional tort
analysis. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 743–67
(2005). First there is the question of whether or not an actor has a “duty” (where the concept
of foreseeability is treated as a question of law for the judge to decide). Id. at 755–60.
Second is the issue of “breach” (where whether the taking of a given action creates
foreseeable harm so as to breach a duty of care). Id. at 744–47. Third, foreseeability arises
when it comes to causation, where we refer to it as “proximate cause.” Id. at 747–50. Our
analysis focuses on the concept of foreseeability in connection with respect to the extent of
damages/harm created by negligent tortfeasors.
231 Cf. SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 202 (noting that, in the context of negligence liability,
victims bear losses when injurers exercise reasonable care).
232 Victim incentives under our proposed foreseeability rule for eggshell cases would
mirror the incentives under negligence rules generally, because negligence law imposes a
foreseeability limitation on recovery. See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the
Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 111, 116 n.17 (1991) (“Under
negligence, the injurer and the victim will exercise optimal precaution.”).
233 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 236–37 (noting that if damages fall short of actual
harm, incentives to reduce risk will be inadequate, and if expected damages exceed harm,
incentives to reduce risk will be too high).
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few, making it likely that the cost of injurers’ misestimation of expected
damages exceeds any eggshell harm prevented by the current eggshell plaintiff
rule.234 Moreover, under a foreseeability rule, the number of eggshell victims
would be even smaller because eggshell victims who can self-protect
presumably would do so.235
A simple example illustrates this point. Under the current rule, drivers are
held liable for the full extent of damages caused by rear-end collisions236—an
extremely common occurrence.237 And yet the cost of 211 million drivers238
taking steps to reduce the risk of eggshell damages (e.g., installing extra
bumpers on their cars) likely outweighs the cost of self-protection incurred by
those eggshell victims who can self-protect, plus the harm caused to the few
eggshell plaintiffs who cannot.239
Third, a foreseeability rule for eggshell liability would ensure predictable
limitations on accident damages, allowing risk-averse individuals to avoid
bearing costs associated with uncertainty, and also enabling them to more
accurately assess their insurance-purchasing needs.240 Under the eggshell
plaintiff rule, risk-averse injurers face uncertain and unknown liability—there is
no way they can know in advance which victims have thin skulls, and what the
234 Cf. POSNER, supra note 22, at 232 (noting, in the context of product liability, that
“product failures that cause serious personal injuries are extremely rare, and the cost to the
consumer of becoming informed about them is apt to exceed the expected benefit”).
235 This is not to argue for a Darwinian, survival-of-the-fittest society. Rather, the point
is that we live in a world of limited resources, and we cannot always prevent every harm.
See Calandrillo, supra note 113, at 1028 (discussing the hard, yet necessary tradeoffs when
rationing society’s limited resources).
236 Not surprisingly, cases discussing the eggshell plaintiff rule frequently involve rearend collisions. See, e.g., Rua v. Kirby, 8 A.3d 1123, 1124–26 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010); Guidry
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 74 So.3d 1276, 1283–84 (La. Ct. App. 2011); Castillo v.
Young, 720 N.W.2d 40, 42, 45–46 (Neb. 2006).
237 Rear-end collisions are the most common type of automobile accident—in the United
States, more than 3.5 million rear-end collisions occurred in 2009 alone. NAT’L SAFETY
COUNCIL, INJURY FACTS 106 (2011), available at http://www.nsc.org/Documents/Injury_
Facts/Injury_Facts_2011_w.pdf.
238 This is the number of licensed drivers in the United States. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 698 tbl.1114 (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/trans.pdf.
239 Of course, where the injurer could avoid the harm for little or no cost, it is preferable
to hold the injurer liable. Still, given the huge disparity between the number of potential
injurers and the number of eggshell victims, it seems unlikely that this would be the case.
240 See Thomas R. Foley, Note, Insurers’ Misrepresentation Defense: The Need for a
Knowledge Element, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 676 (1994) (noting that “insurance buyers
prefer certainty and are risk-averse”); see also Michael Murray, Note, The Law of
Describing Accidents: A New Proposal for Determining the Number of Occurrences in
Insurance, 118 YALE L.J. 1484, 1491 (2009) (“Demand for insurance arises because
individuals are risk averse with regard to losses: they prefer a certain loss to the risk of a
greater loss even when the average loss is the same for both.”).
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full extent of their injury will be.241 Under our proposed rule, however, liability
is limited to foreseeable losses, making it easier for risk-averse injurers to avoid
risk, as well as the pitfalls of excessive levels of care and diluted levels of
activity.242
Of course, “new rules for old problems may help bring on new
problems,”243 and a foreseeability limitation on eggshell liability is no
exception. Most notably, limiting liability for unforeseeable injuries may reduce
injurers’ incentives to consider the full range of injuries that could result from
their actions.244 In addition, awarding average damages to all eggshell plaintiffs
may distort victims’ behavior (now risk-averse eggshell plaintiffs may be led to
take excessive care, while steel skull plaintiffs may have less incentive to take
care).245 Another difficulty in awarding only foreseeable rather than actual
damages in every case is the measurement or calculation of such damages—
how will courts decide what qualifies as “normal” or “average” injuries
stemming from particular actions by injurers?246
None of these problems are new to courts, however. For instance, courts
already limit damages “to the kind of harm” that is reasonably foreseeable,247
even though they do not limit damages relating to the magnitude of that

241 See Klimchuk, supra note 107, at 132 (noting that the eggshell plaintiff rule forces

injurers to “absorb the costs of some unforeseeable injuries”); Jill Wieber Lens, Procedural
Due Process and Predictable Punitive Damage Awards, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1, 40 (“The
eggshell plaintiff rule famously mandates compensation for damages worsened due to a
plaintiff’s preexisting condition, even though the extent of the injury is unforeseeable.”
(footnote omitted)).
242 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 235 (discussing foreseeability, and noting that
“debilitating uncertainty” makes it difficult for injurers to take appropriate care and insure
against losses).
243 Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Do Accounting Rules Matter? The
Dangerous Allure of Mark to Market, 36 J. CORP. L. 513, 518 (2011).
244 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 239.
245 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 238. We also acknowledge the reality that eggshell
victims may not know of their own preexisting conditions, and—even if they do—it may
often be impractical or impossible to warn injurers in advance. For instance, how could an
eggshell pedestrian let a driver know of her unusual condition immediately preceding a car
accident? She likely could not, and one can imagine a variety of other situations where this
is also true. In these circumstances, it would not be reasonable to expect ex ante
communication between the parties or to expect that injurers could alter their care or activity
levels to compensate for the greater risk their actions posed on potential victims.
246 Id. (arguing that an “average” damages approach would “create severe measurement
problems”).
247 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (within the strict liability context);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
(2010) (limiting liability to the harms resulting from the “risks that made the actor’s conduct
tortious”).

412

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:3

harm.248 As such, courts regularly decide the limits of foreseeable harm;249 all
of the above critiques could be waged as general arguments against the modern
tort system, independent of our proposed foreseeability limitation. Additionally,
even if these criticisms have some merit, the benefits of limiting eggshell
liability likely outweigh the costs.250

B. Eggshell Insurance for Victims
Victims still must be compensated for their losses.251 Given the wide
availability of insurance, however, tort liability is not nearly as necessary for
victim compensation as it was in years past.252 Further, the tort system is not a
cost-effective mechanism for making victims whole—for every dollar
compensated to victims through the tort system, the system generates more than
a dollar in administrative costs.253 Thus, some kind of victim insurance likely
would be a cost-effective alternative to the compensatory function served by the
current eggshell plaintiff rule.254
If courts adopt a foreseeability limitation on eggshell liability, private or
public insurance markets could emerge to provide full compensation to eggshell

248 DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 65, at 221; EMERGING ISSUES IN TORT LAW, supra note

65, at 126; ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 65, at 180.
249 Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A
History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 822 (1990) (noting that “courts commonly apply tests of
foreseeability in negligence cases”).
250 Assuming that the number of eggshell plaintiffs is exceedingly small (which is
almost certainly the case for most types of injuries), it is likely that any benefits from the
existing eggshell plaintiff rule are vastly outweighed by the rule’s costs—namely, the
misalignment of injurers’ and victims’ incentives in the vast majority of cases.
251 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 17 (2000) (“Compensation of injured
persons is one of the generally accepted aims of tort law.”).
252 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 268–69.
253 These costs include lawyers’ fees, court fees, time, effort, emotional strain, and other
legal and nonlegal investments in the tort litigation process. See id. at 280–81; see also
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 57–58 (arguing that the tort system is “an exceedingly
costly insurance mechanism” due to its high administrative costs); TILLINGHAST-TOWERS
PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2003 UPDATE 17 (2003), available at https://www.
towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/reports/2003_tort_costs_update/tort_costs_trends_
2003_update.pdf (noting that tort victims receive forty-six cents of each judgment or
settlement dollar).
254 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 57 (“If people who want insurance and are
willing to pay for it can obtain it in the insurance market or in some informal substitute,
there is no apparent reason to use the tort system to provide insurance also.”); SHAVELL,
supra note 22, at 268 (“[I]n the absence of the liability system, compensation of victims
would probably be about as well accomplished through private and social accident insurance
as it is today.”).
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victims.255 Eggshell victims would bear risk associated with their own
vulnerabilities; if victims are risk averse, they would seek “eggshell insurance”
coverage against that risk.256 Theoretically, the insurance markets would be
capable of providing victim compensation without incurring many of the
disadvantages of the current eggshell plaintiff rule—namely, the imposition of
excessive liability upon injurers and the distortion of behavioral incentives
described above.257
We explore the idea of using insurance markets to compensate eggshell
victims by describing several potential problems of doing so (including moral
hazard, adverse selection, and optimism bias).258 We then argue that these
problems can be addressed by either mandating the purchase of private
insurance or by providing social insurance for eggshell victims.259

1. Potential Problems with Eggshell Insurance
There are several potential problems associated with using insurance to
compensate eggshell victims. First, the availability of insurance may produce a
moral hazard effect.260 Ideally, the insurer can observe a victim’s level of care
and can reduce premiums when victims self-protect in order to incentivize
eggshell victims to take optimal care.261 In reality, however, insurers might

255 See, e.g., INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org (last visited July 21, 2012) (indicating

that insurance is offered in a wide variety of contexts, including automobiles, disabilities,
health, life, business, property, and natural disasters).
256 See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 184, at 669; Siegelman, supra note 184, at 1265. Of
course, one could argue that injurers should be required to take out insurance for harm
caused to eggshell plaintiffs rather than placing this burden on victims. Although this
alternative approach might mitigate the problem of risk aversion among injurers, it would
not encourage victims to self-protect. Placing the insurance burden on victims solves this
problem. It also better coincides with the traditional corrective justice rationale underlying
tort law because it avoids situations in which injurers would be forced to pay higher
insurance premiums in order to compensate for unforeseeable harm.
257 See supra Part III.C.`
258 See infra Part IV.B.1.
259 See infra Part IV.B.2.
260 The following discussion mirrors the moral hazard effect described above in the
context of injurers’ incentives under the existing eggshell plaintiff rule. See supra notes 190–
93 and accompanying text. Because a foreseeability rule would shift the risk of eggshell
losses from injurers to victims (inducing victims to purchase insurance), the potential for
moral hazard shifts to victims as well.
261 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 262–63. For example, if the insurer knew that a
particular eggshell plaintiff took precautions such as wearing a helmet or alerting potential
injurers to his fragile condition, the insurer could lower the premium to reflect the reduction
in risk that would result.
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have difficulty observing the level of care taken by eggshell victims,262 in
which case they will not be able to lower premiums to reflect victims’ behavior,
and victims will not have a pecuniary incentive to take care.263
Second, adverse selection might occur.264 Adverse selection problems arise
when the unhealthiest and riskiest segment of the market has a disproportionate
incentive to insure.265 Victims aware of their eggshell condition would be more
likely to buy insurance than “normal” victims with average vulnerabilities.266
Normal victims’ foreseeable injuries would be fully compensated by the tort
system under our proposed rule,267 reducing their need to enter into a secondary
insurance market.268 Normal victims also would refrain from purchasing
insurance due to the perception that they, with merely average risks, would be
subsidizing eggshell victims with above-average risks.269
If only eggshell victims purchase insurance, the insurer will raise the policy
price to account for the fact that the insurance pool has a high degree of risk.270
Premiums will skyrocket, and additional individuals will choose not to
insure.271 As a result of both moral hazard and adverse selection, full coverage
262 For example, insurers may not be able to observe how carefully a victim with
eggshell vulnerabilities crosses the street, whether she wears a helmet on every occasion, or
how diligently she informs injurers of her condition.
263 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 262–63.
264 For discussion on adverse selection, see generally JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC
FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 329–33 (2011); George A. Akerlof, The Market for
“Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970);
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976); Siegelman,
supra note 184.
265 POSNER, supra note 22, at 137.
266 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Cleaning up the Environmental Liability Insurance Mess,
27 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 608 (1993) (describing adverse selection as “the tendency of any
potential policyholder posing an above-average risk to find insurance more attractive than a
policyholder posing an average or below-average risk”).
267 See supra Part IV.A.
268 This reluctance to buy insurance would not be limited to normal victims with average
vulnerabilities; conceivably, eggshell victims who are unaware of their vulnerabilities would
wrongly assume that they run no risk of large losses and would be reluctant to insure as well.
269 Dana L. Kaersvang, Note, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in
Homeowners Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1993, 2010 (2006) (“If risk levels were not
similar among members of [an insurance] pool, those whose risk levels were less than
average for the pool would drop out rather than subsidize higher-risk members.”).
270 POSNER, supra note 22, at 137.
271 Explained in more detail:

When adverse selection occurs, the average expected cost of people in a plan is higher
than the insurer planned. The insurer loses money. If the insurer then raises the
premium, the higher premium causes relatively lower cost people to drop the policy,
which pushes up the average cost of those remaining. The insurer loses money again
and raises the premium again. Again, this forces lower cost people to drop out. This
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could be prohibitively expensive, leading many eggshell victims to forgo
insurance or to purchase only partial coverage against risk.272
Finally, a related problem to adverse selection is the tendency for victims to
systematically misperceive risk and underestimate the occurrence of lowprobability events.273 If potential eggshell victims suffer from optimism bias274
and (wrongly) believe that they are unlikely to suffer extensive injuries due to
the action of a tortfeasor, they would be less likely to purchase insurance
against catastrophic injuries.275 If that is the case, eggshell victims could be
forced to bear potentially ruinous costs.

2. Solving Insurance Problems
Fortunately, many of these problems can be ameliorated by mandating the
purchase of private insurance, using methods that share risk with the insured, or
by providing social insurance for eggshell victims. First, states could require

vicious cycle (sometimes called the “Premium Death Spiral”) continues until only the
highest cost people are left in the policy. Most people have then dropped out and are
uninsured.

Adverse Selection and Cream Skimming, HEALTHINSURANCE.INFO, http://www.
healthinsurance.info/HISEL.HTM (last visited Aug. 1, 2012); see also Loshin, supra note
191, at 506 (discussing the consequences of adverse selection for both insureds and
insurers).
272 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 263; Kenneth S. Reinker & David Rosenberg,
Unlimited Subrogation: Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers to
Take Charge, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S261, S283 n.23 (2007). Under this scenario, eggshell
victims will be exposed to some risk and will have some incentive to take care to avoid
losses not covered by their insurance policies. See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 263.
Precautions will not always be optimal under policies with partial coverage, however. Id.
273 See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 175, at 661–63 (arguing that public misperception of
risk generates irrational market decisions); see also Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 602–03 (1986) (discussing, in the takings context,
the potential for insurance markets to fail where potential victims face low probability risks
and may therefore underestimate the probability of such risks).
274 “Optimism bias refers to the propensity of individuals to consistently underestimate
personal risk in the decision-making context.” Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal
Regulation, or Free Market? An Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1382. Such bias is most likely to occur when individuals perceive a
hazard as having a low probability, and when they have had little personal experience with
the risk. Id. at 1382–83. Optimism bias can result in sub-optimal levels of insurance. Id.
275 See id. at 1382–83 (describing the effects of optimism bias on insurance purchases);
see also Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines for the Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks
into the Health-Insurance Pool with an Idea from Insurance History and Behavioral
Economics, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 79, 95–97 (noting that optimism bias may contribute to
underinsurance among young individuals).
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purchase of eggshell insurance by all citizens.276 Mandating such coverage
would ensure full compensation for eggshell victims, while protecting against
adverse selection277 and optimism bias.278 Insurance mandates are
commonplace. For example, the vast majority of states require drivers to
purchase automobile liability insurance.279 Similarly, states generally require
employers and employees to participate in workers compensation, regardless of
whether the parties would have voluntarily negotiated for it on their own.280
And most recently, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires that
all Americans have health insurance or face a tax “penalty” instead.281 These
mandates reflect society’s judgment that the sharing of extraordinary risks is
preferable to exposing a few individuals to potentially catastrophic losses.282
We submit that eggshell injuries are no different.283
276 Along the same lines as our proposal for eggshell insurance, commentators have

devoted much attention in recent years to the prospect of an individual mandate for health
insurance. See, e.g., LINDA J. BLUMBERG & JOHN HOLAHAN, URBAN INST., DO INDIVIDUAL
MANDATES MATTER? 1–3 (2008), available at www.urban.org/publications/411603.html;
Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 571,
601 (2008); Jonathan Cohn, Mandate Overboard, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 7, 2007, 12:00 AM),
http://www.tnr.com/article/ politics/mandate-overboard.
277 See Russell Korobkin, Determining Health Care Rights from Behind a Veil of
Ignorance, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 801, 826 (arguing that “the obvious response” to adverse
selection “is to mandate participation, just as many states mandate that drivers maintain
automobile insurance”); see also Norman Daniels, The Ethics of Health Reform: Why We
Should Care About Who Is Missing Coverage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1057, 1066–67 (2012).
278 See Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress,
13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 226 (2003) (suggesting that compulsory disaster
insurance may be a potential solution to optimism bias in the context of house construction
in disaster-prone areas).
279 Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125
(2008) (“Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia require automobile liability
insurance covering bodily injury and property damage in specified amounts.”).
280 See Anthony J. Barkume & John W. Ruser, Deregulating Property-Casualty
Insurance Pricing: The Case of Workers’ Compensation, 44 J.L. & ECON. 37, 43 (2001).
281 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). The Supreme Court
upheld the major provisions of the Act in the summer of 2012 in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
282 Jeffrey M. Gaba, Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously: Distributive Justice and
the Takings Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569, 586 (2007) (“Insurance involves the sharing
of risk with others to minimize loss, but, in most economic views, insurance is appropriately
employed only to avoid catastrophic loss from unusual and unpredictable events.”).
283 It is worth noting that a mandate for private eggshell insurance at the state level
would not incur the type of constitutional challenges recently faced by the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, a federal law. See Dan T. Coenen, Originalism and the
“Individual Mandate”: Rounding Out the Government’s Case for Constitutionality, 107 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 55, 62 (2012), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
colloquy/2012/10/ (noting that the parties challenging President Obama’s health care law
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Second, insurers can employ specific methods to reduce both moral hazard
and adverse selection problems in the absence of a mandate.284 Insurers can use
deductibles, coverage limits and exclusions, and co-insurance to share risk with
the insured.285 They also can use other strategies, such as excluding coverage of
losses that the insured could easily prevent and, to the extent that the insurer has
information about the risk levels of insureds, charging different prices to
insureds based on their levels of risk.286
Finally, if mandating private insurance fails to solve some of the problems
described above, policymakers could consider the option of state-based social
insurance.287 Political aversion to the concept aside,288 government could step
in to reimburse eggshell victims for their extraordinary losses, rather than
allowing the tort system to impose exorbitant damages on unsuspecting
tortfeasors in lottery-like fashion.289
Social insurance for eggshell victims would be comparable to today’s
government-run welfare, unemployment, food-assistance, and disability
insurance systems.290 Under a social insurance scheme, general taxes would
fund victim compensation, and thus all of society would share the burden of

“do not argue that the states somehow lack authority to enact individual health insurance
‘mandates’ pursuant to their general police powers”).
284 POSNER, supra note 22, at 136–37.
285 See Loshin, supra note 191, at 506–07 (discussing various methods used by insurers
to combat the moral hazard and adverse selection problems created by insurance).
286 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 136–37.
287 For a general discussion on social insurance, see, for example, GEORGE E. REJDA,
SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY (7th ed. 2012); W.G. Friedmann, Social
Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63 HARV. L. REV. 241 (1949).
288 See, e.g., Dalia Sussman, Poll: 47 Percent Disapprove of Health Care Law, N.Y.
TIMES:
THE
CAUCUS
BLOG
(Mar.
26,
2012,
7:39
AM),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/poll-47-disapprove-of-health-care-law. But
see Kevin Sack & Marjorie Connelly, In Poll, Wide Support for Government-Run Health,
N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/health/policy/
21poll.html?r=1. American skepticism about state-based insurance is not new. More than a
century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes asserted that “[s]tate interference is an evil,” and
argued that “[u]niversal insurance, if desired, can be better and more cheaply accomplished
by private enterprise.” O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881).
289 Unlike premium-funded private insurance, tax dollars would fund social insurance
for eggshell victims. See Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety
Net: The Alternative Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV.
187, 193 (2010) (“In the social insurance context, the government body taxes individuals in
relatively good financial condition to provide transfers to individuals who have suffered
some economic loss.”).
290 For background on these social insurance programs, see Welfare, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/welfare (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
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reimbursing vulnerable victims.291 This would accomplish the compensation
function previously served by tort law’s eggshell plaintiff rule, but without the
accompanying distortionary impact on injurers’ and victims’ behavioral
incentives.292
Social insurance also can resolve the moral hazard and adverse selection
problems described above. The government can use methods similar to those
used by private insurers to incentivize optimal care and avoid moral hazard
issues—namely, methods that ensure that the beneficiaries of social insurance
internalize some of the social costs of their decisions and actions.293 Indeed,
Judge Posner points out that “[g]overnment has powers that a private insurance
company lacks that can alleviate these problems,” such as the ability to
incentivize optimal behavior through the tax code.294 Further, adverse selection
would not be an issue “because no one is permitted to withdraw from the
insurance pool.”295
In sum, private insurance markets could arise in response to a reformulated
eggshell plaintiff rule to solve the problem of providing compensation to
unfortunate victims in our society. Of course, the solution comes with some
drawbacks, including the potential for moral hazard, adverse selection, and
optimism bias. However, these problems can be substantially mitigated by
mandating insurance coverage and by allowing insurers to use certain incentives
to calibrate risk and to induce optimal behavior on the part of insureds. Finally,
in the event that private insurance is not a viable option, society could choose to
adopt a social insurance program in order to ensure that eggshell victims receive
full compensation for their injuries.

C. The Steel Skull Corollary: Foreseeable Damages in All Cases
Given the likelihood of political opposition to state-run social insurance and
even mandated private insurance, courts should consider other solutions as
well.296 One potential alternative is for the tort system to use damages in “steel
291 Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group

Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473, 1505 n.106
(1986).
292 See id. (“For those concerned above all else with compensating victims, the most
effective measure to ensure compensation is social insurance.”).
293 See, e.g., Walter Nicholson, The Evolution of Unemployment Insurance in the United
States, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 123, 129 (2008); Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the
Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 787 (1989).
294 POSNER, supra note 22, at 641.
295 Id. The insurance pool would therefore be representative of all levels of risk in
society and would not shrink to the point where it contains only high-risk individuals.
296 It is not our intention to weigh every possible advantage or disadvantage of our
proposed foreseeability limitation on eggshell liability in this Article. Certainly, there are
dozens of other advantages and disadvantages—beyond those mentioned here—that courts
and policymakers could consider. By weighing the primary advantages and disadvantages of
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skull” cases to cross-subsidize eggshell victims.297 Steel skull individuals are
those victims who suffer relatively minor injuries compared to the average
victim (due to exceptional bone strength, resilience, and so forth).298 Under the
current eggshell plaintiff rule, courts hold the injurer liable for actual damages,
even though he reasonably should have expected to pay far more.299
If courts were to adopt a foreseeability limitation on eggshell liability, they
should hold injurers liable for reasonably foreseeable damages in all cases,
regardless of whether victims have eggshell skulls or steel skulls. In other
words, courts should determine and award the amount of damages that a
“normal” or “average” victim would have suffered, regardless of whether the
actual victim in question has above-average or below-average vulnerabilities.300
Courts could order defendants to deposit the excess damages that steel skull
victims do not need in a special fund, which then could be used to compensate
eggshell victims in other cases.301
This foreseeability-plus-cross-subsidizing approach would be superior to
the current eggshell approach for several reasons. First, it ties damages to
foreseeability in all cases, avoiding costs associated with uncertainty (most
notably, the tendency for risk-averse injurers to exercise socially excessive
a foreseeability rule, we hope to contribute significantly to existing literature on tort law and
the eggshell plaintiff rule. We encourage others to contribute meaningfully to the debate by
weighing additional advantages and disadvantages of our proposal.
297 Cross-subsidization (a common effect when insurance is offered at a uniform price)
involves the use of low-risk individuals to subsidize high-risk individuals. See, e.g., Allison
K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and Health
Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 26–30 (2010) (discussing the cross-subsidizing feature of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).
298 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 238 (referring to “rock skull” cases in which “the
victim has above-average resistance to damage”); see also ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note
65, at 162 (describing the steel skull victims as the “flip side” of eggshell victims, and noting
that in both steel skull and eggshell skull cases, “the tortfeasor’s responsibility is measured
by the actual consequences”).
299 ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 65, at 162.
300 A determination of the “normal” or “average” level of damages is not unlike the
inquiries that judges and jurors make in other contexts. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, On
Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and
the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 822 (2001) (“For as long [as] there has been a tort of
negligence, American courts have defined negligence as conduct in which a reasonable
man . . . would not have engaged.”).
301 See Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 754–58 (2012)
(discussing victim compensation funds). The fact that damages are minimal in steel skull
cases does not address the problem of incentivizing these plaintiffs to bring suit in the first
place. Given that steel skull victims receive minimal damages under both the status quo and
our proposal, what incentive do they have to bring suit? Incentives to bring suit may indeed
be sub-optimal; to address this problem, the government may have to provide steel skull
victims some incentive (e.g., a subsidy or percentage of the total damages) to encourage
them to bring suit. See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 398 (discussing the ability of states to
encourage socially desirable litigation).

420

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:3

levels of care or socially inadequate levels of activity when faced with the
unknown extent of eggshell liability).302 Second, it requires tortfeasors to pay
foreseeable (rather than actual) damages in cases with steel skull victims,
preserving optimal incentives among injurers.303 Third, cross-subsidization of
eggshell victims by steel skull victims ensures full compensation for all
victims,304 while avoiding unnecessary windfalls for steel skull plaintiffs.305
Of course, there are potential problems with this approach as well. First, it
might be difficult to locate tortfeasors who struck steel skull plaintiffs, since
injuries would be minor and plaintiffs may not report them.306 Others are
skeptical about the ability of courts to accurately determine the “normal” scope
of damages.307 Additionally, cross-subsidization of eggshell victims by steel
skull victims would be optimal only if the surplus in damages from steel skull
cases (less administrative costs) roughly equals the shortfall in damages in
eggshell cases—which will not necessarily be the case.308 Perhaps most
troubling, injurers likely would be required to pay “normal” damages into the
special compensation fund even if the steel skull victim in a particular case
suffered no damage at all.309
302 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 260.
303 In contrast, under the current rule tortfeasors pay unusually low damages in steel

skull cases, due to the resiliency of that category of victims. When that occurs, injurers do
not internalize the full cost of behavior that is otherwise dangerous.
304 This fulfills one of the main purposes of tort law. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note
106, at 1–2. Of course, the current eggshell plaintiff rule accomplishes this goal as well,
albeit with significant disadvantages. See supra Part III.C.
305 See Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff’s Windfall from Punitive Damage
Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900, 1903 (1992) (noting that a windfall occurs when “the
payment to the plaintiff . . . exceeds the amount necessary for full compensation”).
306 One should be careful to note, though, that this problem is also the case where a
person attempts but fails to succeed at committing a serious crime. For example, if an actor
shoots to kill an intended target but misses (or the target suffers no harm because he is
wearing a bulletproof vest), society does not simply turn its head and allow the perpetrator to
go free. Rather, the state seeks out such dangerous actors, charges them with attempted
crimes, and sanctions them at a level far greater than the actual harm that the victim
sustained. That makes perfect sense from an economic perspective, as dangerous actors need
to be incentivized to take greater care; absolving them in the case of steel skull victims
would prevent precisely that goal.
307 See, e.g., Aaron J. Wright, Note, Rendered Impracticable: Behavioral Economics
and the Impracticability Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183, 2206 (2005) (citing various
factors that present problems for “rules that require ex post determinations of an event’s
foreseeability”).
308 See William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidies, Third-Party-Payments, and CrossSubsidization: America’s Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 279, 294
(2009) (arguing that attempts at cross-subsidization often are “expensive, function unevenly
and chaotically, and fail to achieve the objectives their proponents desire”).
309 For example, suppose an injurer hits a steel skull victim with her car, but the victim
suffers absolutely no harm. Under the foreseeability-for-all approach, the injurer would
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Although these concerns may have merit to some extent, they are not
unique to our proposal and should not keep courts from experimenting. First, a
judicial assessment of the “normal” scope of damages is no more or less
amorphous than assessments of due care, foreseeability, proximate cause,
reasonableness, and other determinations already made by judges and juries in
tort cases.310 Second, if damage awards in steel skull cases and eggshell cases
do not average out, that would ironically undercut one of the main economic
arguments for the eggshell plaintiff rule itself.311 Third, it is not uncommon for
the law to impose punishment or liability for actions that are considered
dangerous or wrongful, even if no actual harm occurs.312

V. CONCLUSION
An inherent tension underlies the debate over the eggshell plaintiff rule. On
one hand, the rule guarantees that victims are fully compensated for their
losses—an egalitarian concept rooted in society’s desire to make victims whole.
On the other hand, the rule conflicts with the fundamental principle that legal
liability should be limited to foreseeable harm—a notion essential to society’s
perception of the fairness of our judicial system.
An economic analysis of the eggshell plaintiff rule shows why courts
should resolve the debate in favor of foreseeability. The rule creates perverse
behavioral incentives for injurers and victims alike. Exposure to extraordinary
losses often leads injurers to take sub-optimal levels of care and activity. And
full compensation for extraordinary injuries dulls victims’ incentives to take
care.
nonetheless be liable for the amount of damages that would have been suffered by a normal
victim in those circumstances.
310 Joel Levin, Tort Wars, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 869, 878 (2004) (“Much of
tort law rises or falls based on the use of vague concepts like reasonableness, due care,
proximate cause, recklessness, intentionality, and foreseeability.”).
311 The most frequent justification offered by law-and-economics scholars for imposing
full liability in eggshell plaintiff cases is that “there must be [full] liability in the eggshell
skull case to balance nonliability in the ‘rock skull’ case.” POSNER, supra note 22, at 238;
see also JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 17, at 423 (“In a sense, holding injurers liable for all
of the harm suffered by unusually sensitive victims makes up for the benefits that some
injurers get when their victims turn out to be unusually hardy.”); LANDES & POSNER, supra
note 17, at 250 (describing the economic balancing justification for paying actual damages to
eggshell plaintiffs).
312 See, e.g., Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 371, 372 (1835) (awarding
nominal damages for trespass, even though no damage to the land occurred);
Commonwealth v. Gruff, 822 A.2d 773, 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (finding defendant guilty
of assault with a rifle, even though no harm occurred). Moreover, criminal law generally
punishes “attempted” crimes that did not actually succeed because our society is concerned
about deterring similar conduct that has potentially harmful social consequences. See, e.g.,
SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 556–59.
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Courts should take bold action by embracing a foreseeability rule. After all,
bold action is a hallmark of the common law of torts.313 Eggshell liability
should be no exception. By adopting a foreseeability rule for eggshell cases,
courts can take another significant step in the evolution of tort law, while
ensuring that liability rules align private incentives with the greater social good.

313 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440–44 (Cal.
1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (suggesting that strict liability, rather than negligence, should
apply in products liability cases); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99–101
(N.Y. 1928) (establishing the negligence law concept of proximate cause).

